Skip Navigation

This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in ISI Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow Search for citing articles in:
ISI Web of Science (4)
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Kale, J. R.
Right arrow Articles by Noe, T. H.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Related Collections
Right arrow G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

Rev Fin 1997; 10:735-766
© 1997 the Society for Financial Studies

Article

Unconditional and conditional takeover offers: experimental evidence

JR Kale and TH Noez
Georgia State University, USA
z Corresponding author at: A B Freeman School of Business, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA 70118, USA

Abstract

This article compares the predictions of finite-shareholder models of conditional and unconditional takeover offers with the outcomes of laboratory experiments. In addition to differentiating between types of offers, the experimental designs span small and large firms as well as different levels of offer premiums. It is found that in unconditional offers to large groups of subjects (28-40), the symmetric Nash equilibrium predicts observed tendering frequencies quite accurately. For other experimental designs, the results are mixed. The analysis of shareholder tendering strategies from the experiment yields insights into (I) the effects of takeover offer designs, (ii) the appropriateness of finite-shareholder models for research, and (iii) the costs of free riding when shareholders are nonatomistic.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 REV FINANC STUDHome page
A. B. Gillette and T. H. Noe
If at First You Don't Succeed: The Effect of the Option to Resolicit on Corporate Takeovers
Rev. Financ. Stud., June 1, 2006; 19(2): 561 - 603.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.