Skip Navigation

This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in ISI Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow Search for citing articles in:
ISI Web of Science (41)
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Bloomfield, R.
Right arrow Articles by O'Hara, M.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

Rev Fin 1999; 12:5-35
© 1999 the Society for Financial Studies

Article

Market transparency: who wins and who loses?

R Bloomfield and M O'Hara
Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Sage Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA. E-mail: rjb@cornell.edu or mo19@cornell.edu

Abstract

This study uses laboratory experiments to determine the effects of trade and quote disclosure on market efficiency, bid-ask spreads, and trader welfare. We show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices, but also increases opening bid-ask spreads, apparently by reducing market-makers' incentives to compete for order flow. As a result, trade disclosure benefits market makers at the expense of liquidity traders and informed traders. We find that quote disclosure has no discernible effects on market performance. Overall our results demonstrate that the degree of market transparency has important effects of market equilibria and on trader and market-maker welfare.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 REV FINANC STUDHome page
M. A. Goldstein, E. S. Hotchkiss, and E. R. Sirri
Transparency and Liquidity: A Controlled Experiment on Corporate Bonds
Rev. Financ. Stud., March 1, 2007; 20(2): 235 - 273.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 REV FINANC STUDHome page
C. Hommes, J. Sonnemans, J. Tuinstra, and H. van de Velden
Coordination of Expectations in Asset Pricing Experiments
Rev. Financ. Stud., September 1, 2005; 18(3): 955 - 980.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 REV FINANC STUDHome page
T. Hendershott and C. M. Jones
Island Goes Dark: Transparency, Fragmentation, and Regulation
Rev. Financ. Stud., September 1, 2005; 18(3): 743 - 793.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 REV FINANC STUDHome page
P. C. Reiss and I. M. Werner
Anonymity, Adverse Selection, and the Sorting of Interdealer Trades
Rev. Financ. Stud., June 1, 2005; 18(2): 599 - 636.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Disclaimer:
Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.