RFS Advance Access originally published online on August 11, 2003
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Rev Fin 2003; 16:1315-1357
© 2003 the Society for Financial Studies
Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent
Michigan State University
Michigan State University
Address correspondence to Charles J. Hadlock, Department of Finance, 315 Eppley Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1121, or e-mail: hadlock{at}msu.edu.
Abstract
We find that executives who jump to chief executive officer (CEO) positions at new employers come from firms that exhibit aboveaverage stock price performance. This relationship is more pronounced for more senior executives. No such relationship exists for jumps to non-CEO positions. Stock options and restricted stock do not appear to significantly affect the likelihood of jumping ship, but the existence of an "heir apparent" on the management team increases the likelihood that executives will leave for non-CEO positions elsewhere. Hiring grants used to attract managers are correlated with the equity position forfeited at the prior employer and with the prior employer's performance.