RFS Advance Access originally published online on April 2, 2004
Review of Financial Studies 2004 17(4):985-1014; doi:10.1093/rfs/hhh002
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Public Trading and Private Incentives
London School of Economics, FMG, and CEPR London
London Business School, and CEPR London
Address correspondence to Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Department of Accounting and Finance and FMG, London School of Economics and CEPR, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. E-mail: A.Faure-Grimaud{at}lse.ac.uk.
This article studies the link between public trading and the activity of a firm's large shareholder who can affect firm value. Public trading results in the formation of a stock price that is informative about the large shareholder's activity. This increases the latter's incentives to engage in value-increasing activities. Indeed, if he has to liquidate part of his stake before the effect of his activity is publicly observed, a more informative price rewards him for his activity. Implications are derived for the decision to go public, capital structure, and security design.