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RFS Advance Access originally published online on January 5, 2005
Review of Financial Studies 2005 18(3):743-793; doi:10.1093/rfs/hhi013
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© The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oupjournals.org

Island Goes Dark: Transparency, Fragmentation, and Regulation

Terrence Hendershott
University of California at Berkeley

Charles M. Jones
Columbia University

Address correspondence to Terrence Hendershott, Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-1900, or e-mail: hender{at}haas.berkeley.edu.

Responding to a September 2002 regulatory enforcement, the Island electronic communications network stopped displaying its limit order book in the three most active exchange-traded funds (ETFs) where it was the dominant venue. Island’s share of trading activity and price discovery fell, fragmenting the market. ETF prices adjust more slowly when Island goes dark, and there is substantial price discovery movement from ETFs to the futures market. Trading costs increase on Island and decrease off Island, with higher trading costs overall. When Island later redisplays its orders, market quality improves, with transparency and the reduction in fragmentation both playing important roles.


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