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RFS Advance Access originally published online on July 1, 2006
Review of Financial Studies 2007 20(2):491-527; doi:10.1093/rfs/hhl015
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Right arrow D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing
Right arrow G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
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© The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.

Trade Credit: Suppliers as Debt Collectors and Insurance Providers

Vicente Cuñat
Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Address correspondence to Vicente Cuñat, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, C/ Ramon Trias Fargas 25–27, Barcelona 08005, Spain, or e-mail: vicente.cunat{at}upf.edu.


  Abstract

This article examines how in a context of limited enforceability of contracts suppliers may have a comparative advantage over banks in lending to customers because they are able to stop the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may act also as liquidity providers, insuring against liquidity shocks that could endanger the survival of their customer relationships. The relatively high implicit interest rates of trade credit are the result of insurance and default premiums that are amplified whenever suppliers face a relatively high cost of funds. I explore these effects empirically for a panel of UK firms. (JEL: G30, M130, D920)


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Home page
 REV FINANC STUDHome page
M. Giannetti, M. Burkart, and T. Ellingsen
What You Sell Is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts
Rev. Financ. Stud., November 24, 2008; (2008) hhn096v1.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


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