Skip Navigation


RFS Advance Access originally published online on August 27, 2007
Review of Financial Studies 2007 20(6):1865-1900; doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm037
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
20/6/1865    most recent
hhm037v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in ISI Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow Search for citing articles in:
ISI Web of Science (2)
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Duffie, D.
Right arrow Articles by Pedersen, L. H.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Related Collections
Right arrow D40 - General
Right arrow D52 - Incomplete Markets
Right arrow D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge
Right arrow G10 - General
Right arrow G12 - Asset Pricing
Right arrow G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies.

Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets

Darrell Duffie
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University

Nicolae Gârleanu
University of California, Berkeley

Lasse Heje Pedersen
Stern School of Business, New York University

Address correspondence to Darrell Duffie, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015, USA, or e-mail: duffie{at}stanford.edu

JEL: G1, G12, G14, D83, D4, D52


   Abstract

We provide the impact on asset prices of search-and-bargaining frictions in over-the-counter markets. Under certain conditions, illiquidity discounts are higher when counterparties are harder to find, when sellers have less bargaining power, when the fraction of qualified owners is smaller, or when risk aversion, volatility, or hedging demand is larger. Supply shocks cause prices to jump, and then "recover" over time, with a time signature that is exaggerated by search frictions: The price jump is larger and the recovery is slower in less liquid markets. We discuss a variety of empirical implications.


This paper includes work previously distributed under the title "Valuation in Dynamic Bargaining Markets." We are grateful for an insightful comment of Romans Pancs, for conversations with Yakov Amihud, Helmut Bester, Joseph Langsam, Richard Lyons, Tano Santos, and Jeff Zwiebel, and to participants at the NBER Asset Pricing Meeting, the Cowles Foundation Incomplete Markets and Strategic Games Conference, Hitotsubashi University, The London School of Economics, The University of Pennsylania, the Western Finance Association conference, the CEPR meeting at Gerzensee, University College London, The University of California, Berkeley, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Tel Aviv University, Yale University, and Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. We also thank Gustavo Manso for research assistance, as well as the editor and referees for helpful suggestions.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer:
Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.