Skip Navigation


RFS Advance Access originally published online on October 31, 2006
Review of Financial Studies 2008 21(6):2743-2778; doi:10.1093/rfs/hhl044
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
21/6/2743    most recent
hhl044v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Garlappi, L.
Right arrow Articles by Yan, H.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.

Default Risk, Shareholder Advantage, and Stock Returns

Lorenzo Garlappi
University of Texas at Austin

Tao Shu
University of Georgia

Hong Yan
University of South Carolina

Send correspondence to Lorenzo Garlappi, McCombs School of Business, B6600, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, 78712, or e-mail: lorenzo.garlappi{at}mccombs.utexas.edu

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G33


   Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between default probability and stock returns. Using the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) of Moody's KMV, we document that higher default probabilities are not associated with higher expected stock returns. Within a model of bargaining between equity holders and debt holders in default, we show that the relationship between default probability and equity return is (i) upward sloping for firms where shareholders can extract little benefit from renegotiation (low "shareholder advantage") and (ii) humped and downward sloping for firms with high shareholder advantage. This dichotomy implies that distressed firms with stronger shareholder advantage should exhibit lower expected returns in the cross section. Our empirical evidence, based on several proxies for shareholder advantage, is consistent with the model's predictions.


We are grateful to Moody's KMV for providing us with the data on Expected Default FrequencyFormula (EDFFormula ) and to Jeff Bohn and Shisheng Qu of Moody's KMV for help with the data and for insightful suggestions. We appreciate useful comments and suggestions from Jonathan Berk, Jason Chen, Kent Daniel, Sanjiv Das, Sergei Davydenko, Mara Faccio, Andras Fulop, Raymond Kan, Hayne Leland, Mahendrarajah Nimalendran, Burton Hollifield, George Oldfield, Hernan Ortiz-Molina, Ramesh Rao, Jacob Sagi, Matthew Spiegel (the editor), Sheridan Titman, Stathis Tompaidis, Raman Uppal, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at George Washington University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, University of California at Berkeley, University of Hong Kong, University of Lausanne, University of South Carolina, University of Texas at Austin, University of Toronto, University of Vienna, the Eighth Texas Finance Festival, the Third UBC Summer Conference, the Third Moody's NYU Credit Risk Conference, and the 2006 "Festkolloquium" in honor of Phelim Boyle. We are responsible for all errors in the paper. Part of this work was done while Yan was a visiting scholar in the Office of Economic Analysis at the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission. The SEC disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement of any SEC employee.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.