Skip Navigation


RFS Advance Access originally published online on January 5, 2008
Review of Financial Studies 2009 22(5):1955-1980; doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm083
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
22/5/1955    most recent
hhm083v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Evans, R. B.
Right arrow Articles by Reed, A. V.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Failure Is an Option: Impediments to Short Selling and Options Prices

Richard B. Evans
Darden School at the University of Virginia

Christopher C. Geczy and David K. Musto
The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania

Adam V. Reed
Kenan-Flagler Business School at the University of North Carolina

Send Correspondence to Adam Reed, Campus Box 3490, McColl Building, Chapel Hill, NC 27514; phone: (919) 962-9785; E-mail: adam_reed{at}unc.edu.

JEL Classification: G12, G13, G29


   Abstract

Regulations allow market makers to short sell without borrowing stock, and the transactions of a major options market maker show that in most hard-to-borrow situations, it chooses not to borrow and instead fails to deliver stock to its buyers. A part of the value of failing passes through to options prices: when failing is cheaper than borrowing, the relation between borrowing costs and options prices is significantly weaker. The remaining value is profit to the market maker, and its ability to profit despite competition between market makers appears to result from the cost advantage of larger market makers.


We gratefully acknowledge important input from two anonymous referees, Michael Brandt, Greg Brown, Jennifer Conrad, George Constantinides, Patrick Dennis, Darrell Duffie, Bin Gao, Eitan Goldman, Rick Green, Jonathan Karpoff, Richard Rendleman, Erik Stafford, and seminar participants at Notre Dame, USC, UT, Wharton, and the 2002 Western Finance Association Meetings. We thank Wes Gray and Robert Turnquest for excellent research assistance.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.