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Rev Fin 1993; 6:213-232
© 1993 the Society for Financial Studies
Article |
Credit market equilibrium with bank monitoring and moral hazard
Department of Management and Strategy, Kellog Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201, USA
1 University of South Florida, USA
z Corresponding author
Abstract
We characterize a credit market equilibrium in which banks coexist with capital markets and firms obtain funding from both sources. An incentive problem exists between the firm's insiders and outside providers of capital. Banks can provide not only credit but also monitoring services. We show that when banks cannot precommit to a particular level of monitoring there is a unique credit market equilibrium with firms being financed with a combination of bank credit and external capital. In this equilibrium, a marginal substitution of bank credit for capital market financing would raise the firm's stock price.
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