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Rev Fin 1995; 8:327-367
© 1995 the Society for Financial Studies

Article

The role of games in security design

M Harris1 and A Raviv2
1 University of Chicago, Chicago, USA
2 Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208, USA

Abstract

We contend that security design should be approached as a problem of game design. That is, contracts should specify that procedures that govern the behavior of contract participants in determining outcomes as well as the allocations resulting from those outcomes. We characterize optimal contracts in two nested classes: all contracts (including those that depend on the state) and state-independent contracts. We demonstrate that, in situations in which the dependence of contracts on the state is limited, contracts designed as games can improve the allocation of resources relative to nonstrategic allocation rules.


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