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Rev Fin 1995; 8:545-577
© 1995 the Society for Financial Studies
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A theory of mutual formation and moral hazard with evidence from the history of the insurance industry
Cornell University, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, USA
Abstract
Nonprofit, mutually owned insurance and banking organizations have significant market shares in the insurance and banking industries. A first step in a systematic study of these financial mutuals is to examined the reasons for their formation. Doing so provides empirical support for the view that these mutuals arose as an efficient means of addressing contracting challenges caused by aggregate uncertainties and moral hazard. A formal model with this property is presented. We argue that information asymmetries do more to explain the kinds of contracts offered by financial mutuals than do agency problems between owners, managers, and customers.
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