RFS Advance Access published online on September 20, 2009
Review of Financial Studies, doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp059
Market-Based Corrective Actions
University of Pennsylvania
University of Pennsylvania
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Send correspondence to Philip Bond, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2300 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104; telephone: (215) 898-2370; fax: 215-898-6200. E-mail: pbond{at}wharton.upenn.edu
JEL Classification: D53, D80, G14, G21, G28, G34
| Abstract |
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Many economic agents take corrective actions based on information inferred from market prices of firms securities. Examples include directors and activists intervening in the management of firms and bank supervisors taking actions to improve the health of financial institutions. We provide an equilibrium analysis of such situations in light of a key problem: if agents use market prices when deciding on corrective actions, prices adjust to reflect this use and potentially become less revealing. We show that market information and agents information are complementary, and discuss measures that can increase agents ability to learn from market prices.
We thank Beth Allen, Franklin Allen, Mitchell Berlin, Alon Brav, Thomas Chemmanur, Douglas Diamond, Alex Edmans, Andrea Eisfeldt, Gary Gorton, Wei Jiang, Richard Kihlstrom, Rajdeep Sengupta, Holger Spamann, Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, an anonymous referee, and the editor (Paolo Fulghieri) for their comments and suggestions. We also thank seminar participants at numerous universities and conferences for their comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.