Skip Navigation


RFS Advance Access originally published online on July 6, 2006
Review of Financial Studies 2007 20(3):741-768; doi:10.1093/rfs/hhl027
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
20/3/741    most recent
hhl027v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in ISI Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Irvine, P.
Right arrow Articles by Puckett, A.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Related Collections
Right arrow G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
Right arrow G18 - Government Policy and Regulation
Right arrow G23 - Pension Funds; Other Private Financial Institutions
Right arrow G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Rating Agencies
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.

Tipping

Paul Irvine
Terry College of Business, University of Georgia

Marc Lipson
Darden Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Virginia

Andy Puckett
University of Missouri

Address correspondence to Paul Irvine, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602, or e-mail: pirvine{at}terry.uga.edu

We investigate the trading of institutions immediately before the release of analysts’ initial buy recommendations. We document abnormally high institutional trading volume and buying beginning five days before recommendations are publicly released. Abnormal buying is related to initiation characteristics that would require knowledge of the content of the report—such as the identity of the analyst and brokerage firm, and whether the recommendation is a strong buy. We confirm that institutions buying before the recommendation release earn abnormal profits. Our results are consistent with institutional traders receiving tips regarding the contents of forthcoming analysts’ reports. (JEL G14, G18, G24)


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.