RFS Advance Access originally published online on July 27, 2006
Review of Financial Studies 2008 21(5):2275-2306; doi:10.1093/rfs/hhl029
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Strong-Form Efficiency with Monopolistic Insiders
ESSEC Business School
London School of Economics, CEPR, and NBER
Address correspondence to Dimitri Vayanos, Department of Accounting and Finance, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK, or e-mail: d.vayanos{at}lse.ac.uk.
JEL Classification: D82, G14
| Abstract |
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We study market efficiency in an infinite-horizon model with a monopolistic insider. The insider can trade with competitive market makers and noise traders, and observes privately the expected growth rate of asset dividends. In the absence of the insider, this information would be reflected in prices only after a long series of dividend observations. Thus, the insiders information is "long-lived." Surprisingly, however, the monopolistic insider chooses to reveal her information very quickly, within a time converging to zero as the market approaches continuous trading. Although the market converges to strong-form efficiency, the insiders profits do not converge to zero.
We thank Bruno Biais, Andrew Ellul, Denis Gromb, Harrison Hong, Jonathan Lewellen, Maureen OHara, Andrew Patton, Anna Pavlova, Michela Verardo, Jiang Wang, Jean-Pierre Zigrand, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at AFFI, EFA, ESSEC, and HEC for helpful comments and suggestions. A previous version of this article was circulated under the title "Positive Profits when Prices are Strongly Efficient."