RFS Advance Access published online on August 11, 2003
Review of Financial Studies, doi:10.1093/rfs/hhg023
Review of Financial Studies © The Society for Financial Studies 2003; all rights reserved
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* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: elib{at}idc.ac.il.
This article presents a theory of capital allocation that shows how the use of net present value as an investment criterion leads to inefficient capital budgeting outcomes and how this criterion may be dominated by other capital budgeting criteria, like the internal rate of return and the profitability index. The essence of our theory is rooted in the mainstream paradigm of corporate finance: while firms use net present value to measure the addition to firm value from prospective projects, "classical" informational and agency considerations prevent it from implementing the optimal capital budgeting outcome. Our theory also identifies conditions when alternative criteria should be used. Finally, we characterize when direct monitoring through capital budgeting dominates compensation contracts in alleviating the agency problem.
© 2003 The Society for Financial Studies
Original Articles
Why the NPV Criterion Does Not Maximize NPV
1 Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya (IDC)
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