RFS Advance Access published online on May 25, 2005
Review of Financial Studies, doi:10.1093/rfs/hhi024
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* To whom correspondence should be addressed. This paper studies information acquisition through investment in improved risk assessment technology in competitive credit markets. A technology has two attributes: its ability to screen in productive borrowers, and its ability to screen out unproductive borrowers. The two attributes have fundamentally different effects on acquisition incentives and the structure of equilibrium informational externalities between lenders. The paper also studies how uncertainty associated with the quality of superior technology affects information acquisition incentives. Uncertainty influences information acquisition even with risk-neutral banks. Increased uncertainty may raise or dampen incentives, depending on whether uncertainty is respectively about screening out or screening in quality.
Article
Information Acquisition under Uncertainty in Credit Markets
1 Department of Agricultural, Environmental and Development Economics, Ohio State University, 2120 Fyffe Road, Columbus, OH 43210
Priyodorshi Banerjee, E-mail: banerjee.29{at}osu.edu
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