Skip Navigation



RFS Advance Access published online on July 31, 2006
Review of Financial Studies, doi:10.1093/rfs/hhl032
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (Accepted Manuscript)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
21/4/1833    most recent
hhl032v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Ayyagari, M.
Right arrow Articles by Maksimovic, V.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Article

How Well Do Institutional Theories Explain Firms’ Perceptions of Property Rights?

Meghana Ayyagari 1, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt 2, and Vojislav Maksimovic 3 *
1 School of Business, George Washington University
2 World Bank
3 University of Maryland

* To whom correspondence should be addressed.
Vojislav Maksimovic, E-mail: vmaksimovic{at}rhsmith.umd.edu


  Abstract

We examine how well several institutional- and firm-level factors explain firms’ perceptions of property rights protection. The institutional theories we investigate account for approximately 50 percent of the country-level variation, indicating that current research addresses first-order factors. Firm-level characteristics, such as legal organization and ownership structure, are comparable to institutional factors in explaining variations in property rights protection. A country’s legal origin predicts property rights variation better than its religion, ethnic fractionalization, or natural endowments. However, these results are driven by the inclusion of former Socialist economies in the sample. When we exclude the former Socialist economies, legal origin explains considerably less than ethnic fractionalization does.

Keywords: Law, Property Rights, Variance Decomposition.
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 WORLD BANK ECON REVHome page
M. Ayyagari, A. Demirguc-Kunt, and V. Maksimovic
How Important Are Financing Constraints? The Role of Finance in the Business Environment
World Bank Econ. Rev., November 20, 2008; (2008) lhn018v1.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.