RFS Advance Access published online on January 22, 2007
Review of Financial Studies, doi:10.1093/revfin/hhm001
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Walrasian Tâtonnement Auctions on the Tokyo Grain Exchange
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
University of California at Davis
williams{at}primal.ucdavis.edu
The TGE's itayose mechanism provides the opportunity to analyze functioning Walrasian tâtonnement auctions. In 15,677 auctions conducted over 1997-98 for corn and redbean futures contracts, price formation is unexpectedly similar to that observed in continuous double auctions. Provisional prices and pledges are informative. In contrast to behavior observed in experiments, few pledges are deceptive, because the traders participate repeatedly and because the auctioneer has flexibility when changing the provisional price and ending the auction. Both the risk of the auction ending and the more equitable dispersion of information increase depth and the speed at which information is embodied in price.