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<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn045v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Margin Trading, Overpricing, and Synchronization Risk]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn045v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We provide experimental evidence that relaxing margin restrictions to allow more short selling can exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. This is because smart-money traders initially profit more by front-running optimistic investor sentiment than by disciplining prices. When short selling is not possible, competitive pressures among arbitrageurs rapidly drive prices to the equilibrium. However, the risk of margin calls slows the convergence process, because arbitrageurs who sell short too early face substantial losses if they are unable to synchronize their trades with other arbitrageurs (as in Abreu and Brunnermeier. 2002. <I>Journal of Financial Economics</I> 66(2&ndash;3):341&ndash;60; 2003. <I>Econometrica</I> 71(1):173&ndash;204).</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bhojraj, S., Bloomfield, R. J., Tayler, W. B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-05-07</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn045</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Margin Trading, Overpricing, and Synchronization Risk]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-05-07</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn034v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Does Capital Account Liberalization Lead to Growth?]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn034v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We test whether capital account liberalization led to higher economic growth using <I>de jure</I> measures of capital account and financial current account openness for 94 nations, from 1950 (or independence) onward. We argue that measurement error, differing time periods used, and collinearity among independent variables account for conflicting results in prior scholarship. We use pooled time-series, cross-sectional OLS and system GMM estimators to examine economic growth rates, 1955&ndash;2004. Capital account liberalization had a positive association with growth in both developed and emerging market nations. We confirm that equity market liberalization has an independent effect on economic growth.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Quinn, D. P., Toyoda, A. M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-05-07</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn034</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Does Capital Account Liberalization Lead to Growth?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-05-07</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn042v2?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Mutual Fund Fees Around the World]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn042v2?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Using a new database, we study fees charged by 46,580 mutual fund classes offered for sale in 18 countries, which account for about 86% of the world fund industry in <cross-ref type="bib" refid="hhn042R14">2002</cross-ref>. We examine management fees, total expense ratios, and total shareholder costs (including load charges). Fees vary substantially across funds and from country to country. To explain these differences, we consider fund, sponsor, and national characteristics. Fees differ by investment objectives: larger funds and fund complexes charge lower fees; fees are higher for funds distributed in more countries and funds domiciled in certain offshore locations (especially when selling into countries levying higher taxes). Substantial cross-country differences persist even after controlling for these variables. These remaining differences can be explained by a variety of factors, the most robust of which is that fund fees are lower in countries with stronger investor protection.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Khorana, A., Servaes, H., Tufano, P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-29</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn042</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Mutual Fund Fees Around the World]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-29</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn040v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[A General Stochastic Volatility Model for the Pricing of Interest Rate Derivatives]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn040v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We develop a tractable and flexible stochastic volatility multifactor model of the term structure of interest rates. It features unspanned stochastic volatility factors, correlation between innovations to forward rates and their volatilities, quasi-analytical prices of zero-coupon bond options, and dynamics of the forward rate curve, under both the actual and risk-neutral measures, in terms of a finite-dimensional affine state vector. The model has a very good fit to an extensive panel dataset of interest rates, swaptions, and caps. In particular, the model matches the implied cap skews and the dynamics of implied volatilities.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Trolle, A. B., Schwartz, E. S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-28</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn040</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A General Stochastic Volatility Model for the Pricing of Interest Rate Derivatives]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-28</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn037v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Optimal Executive Compensation when Firm Size Follows Geometric Brownian Motion]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn037v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This paper studies a continuous-time agency model in which the agent controls the drift of the geometric Brownian motion firm size. The changing firm size generates partial incentives, analogous to awarding the agent equity shares according to her continuation payoff. When the agent is as patient as investors, performance-based stock grants implement the optimal contract. Our model generates a leverage effect on the equity returns, and implies that the agency problem is more severe for smaller firms. That the empirical evidence shows that grants compensation are largely based on the CEO's historical performance&mdash;rather than current performance&mdash;lends support to our model.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[He, Z.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-22</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn037</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Optimal Executive Compensation when Firm Size Follows Geometric Brownian Motion]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-22</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn046v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Just How Much Do Individual Investors Lose by Trading?]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn046v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Individual investor trading results in systematic and economically large losses. Using a complete trading history of all investors in Taiwan, we document that the aggregate portfolio of individuals suffers an annual performance penalty of 3.8 percentage points. Individual investor losses are equivalent to 2.2% of Taiwan's gross domestic product or 2.8% of the total personal income. Virtually all individual trading losses can be traced to their aggressive orders. In contrast, institutions enjoy an annual performance boost of 1.5&nbsp;percentage points, and both the aggressive and passive trades of institutions are profitable. Foreign institutions garner nearly half of institutional profits.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Barber, B. M., Lee, Y.-T., Liu, Y.-J., Odean, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-19</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn046</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Just How Much Do Individual Investors Lose by Trading?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn041v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Choice of Corporate Liquidity and Corporate Governance]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn041v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>In this paper, I study how corporate governance influences firms&rsquo; choices between cash and lines of credit. Stakeholders may disagree about firms&rsquo; liquidity choices because they differ in the allocation of ex-post control rights for the firms&rsquo; liquidity reserves. Using state-level changes in takeover protection as exogenous shocks to corporate governance, I find that firms increase cash relative to lines of credit when the threat of takeover weakens. Consistent with the theory, this tendency is weaker for firms with good internal governance. Overall, my findings suggest the choice of corporate liquidity is a channel through which corporate governance works.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Yun, H.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-19</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn041</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Choice of Corporate Liquidity and Corporate Governance]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn036v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Asset Salability and Debt Maturity: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century American Railroads]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn036v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>I investigate the effect of assets' liquidation values on capital structure by exploiting the diversity of track gauges in nineteenth-century American railroads. The abundance of track gauges limited the redeployability of rolling stock and tracks to potential users with similar track gauge. Moreover, potential demand for both rolling stock and tracks was further diminished when many railroads went under equity receiverships. I find that the potential demand for a railroad's rolling stock and tracks were significant determinants of debt maturity and the amount of debt that was issued by railroads. The results are consistent with liquidation values models of financial contracting and capital structure.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Benmelech, E.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-18</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn036</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Asset Salability and Debt Maturity: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century American Railroads]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-18</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn035v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Do Retail Trades Move Markets?]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn035v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We study the trading of individual investors using transaction data and identifying buyer- or seller-initiated trades. We document four results: (1) Small trade order imbalance correlates well with order imbalance based on trades from retail brokers. (2) Individual investors herd. (3) When measured annually, small trade order imbalance forecasts future returns; stocks heavily bought underperform stocks heavily sold by 4.4 percentage points the following year. (4) Over a weekly horizon, small trade order imbalance reliably predicts returns, but in the opposite direction; stocks heavily bought one week earn strong returns the subsequent week, while stocks heavily sold earn poor returns.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Barber, B. M., Odean, T., Zhu, N.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-16</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn035</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Do Retail Trades Move Markets?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-16</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn039v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Idiosyncratic Return Volatility, Cash Flows, and Product Market Competition]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn039v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Over the past 40 years, the volatility of the average stock return has drastically outpaced total market volatility. Thus, idiosyncratic return volatility has dramatically increased. We estimate this increase to be 6% per year. Consistent with an efficient market, this result is mirrored by an increase in the idiosyncratic volatility of fundamental cash flows. We argue that these findings are attributable to the more intense economy-wide competition. Various cross-sectional and time-series tests support this idea. Economic competitiveness facilitates reinterpretation of the results from the cross-country <I>R</I><sup>2</sup> literature, as well as the US idiosyncratic risk literature.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Irvine, P. J., Pontiff, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-15</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn039</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Idiosyncratic Return Volatility, Cash Flows, and Product Market Competition]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-15</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn043v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Average Idiosyncratic Volatility in G7 Countries]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn043v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We argue that changes in average idiosyncratic volatility provide a proxy for changes in the investment opportunity set and that this proxy is closely related to the book-to-market factor. We test this idea in two ways using G7 countries&rsquo; data. First, we show that idiosyncratic volatility has statistically significant predictive power for aggregate stock market returns over time. Second, we show that idiosyncratic volatility performs just as well as the book-to-market factor in explaining the cross section of stock returns. Our results suggest that the hedge against changes in investment opportunities is an important determinant of asset prices.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Guo, H., Savickas, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-11</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn043</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Average Idiosyncratic Volatility in G7 Countries]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-11</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn038v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Variance Risk Premiums]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn038v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We propose a direct and robust method for quantifying the variance risk premium on financial assets. We show that the risk-neutral expected value of return variance, also known as the variance swap rate, is well approximated by the value of a particular portfolio of options. We propose to use the difference between the realized variance and this synthetic variance swap rate to quantify the variance risk premium. Using a large options data set, we synthesize variance swap rates and investigate the historical behavior of variance risk premiums on five stock indexes and 35 individual stocks.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Carr, P., Wu, L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-10</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn038</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Variance Risk Premiums]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-10</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn032v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Takeovers and the Cross-Section of Returns]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn032v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This paper considers the impact of the takeover likelihood on firm valuation. If firms are more likely to acquire when there is more free cash or lower required rates of return, the targets become more sensitive to shocks to cash flows or the price of risk. <I>Ceteris paribus</I>, firms exposed to takeovers have different rates of return than protected firms. Using takeover likelihood estimates, we create a "takeover factor," buying (selling) firms with a high (low) takeover likelihood, which generates "abnormal" returns. Several tests confirm that the takeover factor helps explaining cross-sectional differences in equity returns and is related to takeover activity.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cremers, K. J. M., Nair, V. B., John, K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn032</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Takeovers and the Cross-Section of Returns]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-02</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn030v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Stock Market and Corporate Investment: A Test of Catering Theory]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn030v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We test a catering theory describing how stock market mispricing might influence individual firms' investment decisions. We use discretionary accruals as our proxy for mispricing. We find a positive relation between abnormal investment and discretionary accruals; that abnormal investment is more sensitive to discretionary accruals for firms with higher R&amp;D intensity (opaque firms) or share turnover (firms with shorter shareholder horizons); that firms with high abnormal investment subsequently have low stock returns; and that the larger the relative price premium, the stronger the abnormal return predictability. We show that patterns in abnormal returns are stronger for firms with higher R&amp;D intensity or share turnover.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Polk, C., Sapienza, P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn030</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Stock Market and Corporate Investment: A Test of Catering Theory]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-02</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn028v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[A Liquidity-Based Theory of Closed-End Funds]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn028v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This paper develops a rational, liquidity-based model of closed-end funds (CEFs) that provides an economic motivation for the existence of this organizational form: They offer a means for investors to buy illiquid securities, without facing the potential costs associated with direct trading and without the externalities imposed by an open-end fund structure. Our theory predicts the patterns observed in CEF initial public offerings (IPOs) and the observed behavior of the CEF discount, which results from a trade-off between the liquidity benefits of investing in the CEF and the fees charged by the fund's managers. In particular, the model explains why IPOs occur in waves in certain sectors at a time, why funds are issued at a premium to net asset value (NAV), and why they later usually trade at a discount. We also conduct an empirical investigation, which, overall, provides more support for a liquidity-based model than for an alternative sentiment-based explanation.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cherkes, M., Sagi, J., Stanton, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn028</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A Liquidity-Based Theory of Closed-End Funds]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-02</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn017v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn017v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We analyze the design and renegotiation of covenants in debt contracts as a specific example of the contractual assignment of property rights under asymmetric information. Specifically, we consider a setting where managers are better informed than lenders regarding potential transfers from debt to equity associated with future investments. This simple adverse-selection problem leads to the allocation of greater <I>ex ante</I> decision rights to the creditor (the uninformed party), i.e., tighter covenants, than would follow under symmetric information. This corresponds well to empirical evidence indicating that covenants are very tight upon inception and are frequently waived (and never tightened) upon renegotiation.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Garleanu, N., Zwiebel, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn017</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-02</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn026v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Leasing, Ability to Repossess, and Debt Capacity]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn026v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This paper studies the financing role of leasing and secured lending. We argue that the benefit of leasing is that repossession of a leased asset is easier than foreclosure on the collateral of a secured loan, which implies that leasing has higher debt capacity than secured lending. However, leasing involves agency costs due to the separation of ownership and control. More financially constrained firms value the additional debt capacity more and hence lease more of their capital than less constrained firms. We provide empirical evidence consistent with this prediction. Our theory is consistent with the explanation of leasing by practitioners, namely that leasing "preserves capital," which the academic literature considers a fallacy.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eisfeldt, A. L., Rampini, A. A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-29</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn026</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Leasing, Ability to Repossess, and Debt Capacity]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-29</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn025v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Do IPOs Affect the Prices of Other Stocks? Evidence from Emerging Markets]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn025v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We show that the introduction of a large asset permanently affects the prices of existing assets in a market. Using data from 254 initial public offerings (IPOs) in 22 emerging markets, we find that portfolios that covary highly with the IPO experience a decline in prices relative to other portfolios during the month of the issue. The effects are stronger when the IPO is issued in a market that is less integrated internationally and when the IPO is bigger. This evidence is consistent with the idea that shocks to asset supply have a significant effect on asset prices.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Braun, M., Larrain, B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-29</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn025</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Do IPOs Affect the Prices of Other Stocks? Evidence from Emerging Markets]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-29</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn023v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Incentives and Mutual Fund Performance: Higher Performance or Just Higher Risk Taking?]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn023v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We study the impact of contractual incentives on the performance of mutual funds. We find that high-incentive contracts induce managers to take more risk and reduce the funds&rsquo; probability of survival. Yet, funds with high-incentive contracts deliver higher risk-adjusted return, and the superior performance remains persistent. The top incentive quintile of funds outperforms the bottom quintile by 2.70% per year. Moreover, high-incentive winner funds from one year have a positive alpha of 0.41% per month in the following year. Focusing on funds&rsquo; holdings, we show that active portfolio rebalancing is the main channel through which incentives increase performance.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massa, M., Patgiri, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-29</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn023</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Incentives and Mutual Fund Performance: Higher Performance or Just Higher Risk Taking?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-29</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn021v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Nondiversification Traps in Catastrophe Insurance Markets]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn021v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We develop a model for markets for catastrophic risk. The model explains why insurance providers may choose not to offer insurance for catastrophic risks and not to participate in reinsurance markets, even though there is a large enough market capacity to reach full risk sharing through diversification in a reinsurance market. This is a "nondiversification trap." We show that nondiversification traps may arise when risk distributions have heavy left tails and insurance providers have limited liability. When they are present, there may be a coordination role for a centralized agency to ensure that risk sharing takes place.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ibragimov, R., Jaffee, D., Walden, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-29</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn021</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Nondiversification Traps in Catastrophe Insurance Markets]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-29</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn024v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Nature and Persistence of Buyback Anomalies]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn024v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Using recent data, we reject the hypothesis that the buyback anomalies first reported by <cross-ref type="bib" refid="R26">Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990</cross-ref>, <I>Journal of Finance</I> 45:455&ndash;77) and <cross-ref type="bib" refid="R21">Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995</cross-ref>, <I>Journal of Financial Economics</I> 39:181&ndash;208) have disappeared over time. We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that open market repurchases are a response to a market overreaction to bad news: significant analyst downgrades, combined with overly pessimistic forecasts of long-term earnings. Stock prices after tender offers are set as if all investors tender their shares, but empirically they do not. Thus, the arbitrage opportunity persists because the market sets prices as if the average, not the marginal investor, determines the stock price.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peyer, U., Vermaelen, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-27</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn024</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Nature and Persistence of Buyback Anomalies]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-27</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn022v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Trading Restrictions and Stock Prices]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn022v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>I examine a series of stock splits in Japan in which firms restrict the ability of their investors to sell their shares for a period of approximately 2 months. By removing potential sellers from the market, the restrictions have the effect of increasing the impact of trading on prices. The greater the desire of investors to trade, and the greater the restrictions, the larger the impact of the restrictions. In the data, particularly severe restrictions are associated with returns of over 30% around the ex-date, most of which are reversed when investors are allowed to sell again. Firms are more likely to issue equity or redeem convertible debt during the restricted period, suggesting strong incentives for manipulation.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Greenwood, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-27</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn022</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Trading Restrictions and Stock Prices]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-27</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn020v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Differences of Opinion of Public Information and Speculative Trading in Stocks and Options]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn020v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We analyze the effects of differences of opinion on the dynamics of trading volume in stocks and options. We find that disagreements about the mean of the current- and next-period public information lead to trading in stocks in the current period but have no effect on options trading. Without options, we find that disagreements about the precision of all past and current public information affect trading in stocks in the current period. With options, only disagreements about the precisions of the next- and current-period information affect stocks and options trading in the current period. Our results suggest that options trading is concentrated around information events that are likely to cause disagreements among investors, whereas trading in stocks may be diffusive over many periods.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cao, H. H., Ou-Yang, H.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-27</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn020</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Differences of Opinion of Public Information and Speculative Trading in Stocks and Options]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-27</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn019v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[How Do Mergers Create Value? A Comparison of Taxes, Market Power, and Efficiency Improvements as Explanations for Synergies]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn019v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>There is little evidence in the literature on the relative importance of the underlying sources of merger gains. Prior literature suggests that synergies could arise due to taxes, market power, or efficiency improvements. Based on Value Line forecasts, we estimate the average synergy gains in a broad sample of 264 large mergers to be 10.03% of the combined equity value of the merging firms. The detailed data in Value Line projections allow for the decomposition of these gains into underlying operating and financial synergies. We estimate that tax savings contribute only 1.64% in additional value, while operating synergies account for the remaining 8.38%. Operating synergies are higher in focused mergers, while tax savings constitute a large fraction of the gains in diversifying mergers. The operating synergies are generated primarily by cutbacks in investment expenditures rather than by increased operating profits. Overall, the evidence suggests that mergers generate gains by improving resource allocation rather than by reducing tax payments or increasing the market power of the combined firm.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Devos, E., Kadapakkam, P.-R., Krishnamurthy, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-27</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn019</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[How Do Mergers Create Value? A Comparison of Taxes, Market Power, and Efficiency Improvements as Explanations for Synergies]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-27</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn018v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Corporate Governance Transfer and Synergistic Gains from Mergers and Acquisitions]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn018v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We present evidence on the benefits of changes in control from mergers and acquisitions. We find that the stronger the acquirer's shareholder rights relative to the target&rsquo;s, the higher the synergy created by an acquisition. This result supports the hypothesis that acquisitions of firms with poor corporate governance by firms with good corporate governance generate higher total gains. We also find that the synergy effect of corporate governance is shared by target shareholders and acquiring shareholders, in that both target returns and acquirer returns increase with the shareholder-rights difference between the acquirer and the target.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wang, C., Xie, F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-26</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn018</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Corporate Governance Transfer and Synergistic Gains from Mergers and Acquisitions]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-26</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn029v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Motivating Entrepreneurial Activity in a Firm]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn029v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We examine the problem of motivating privately informed managers to engage in entrepreneurial activity to improve the quality of the firm's investment opportunities. The firm's investment and compensation policy must balance the manager's incentives to provide entrepreneurial effort and to report private information truthfully. The optimal policy is to underinvest (compared to first-best) and provide weak incentive pay in low-quality projects and overinvest (compared to first-best) and provide strong incentive pay in high-quality projects.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bernardo, A. E., Cai, H., Luo, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-21</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn029</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Motivating Entrepreneurial Activity in a Firm]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-21</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn013v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Strategic Disclosure and Stock Returns: Theory and Evidence from US Cross-Listing]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn013v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>When a firm exercises discretion to disclose or withhold information (strategic disclosure), risk-averse investors command higher expected returns when expected cash flows decrease, producing a negative correlation between these expectations. Moreover, stock returns exhibit stronger reversal than they do when full disclosure is enforced. We propose a model that makes these predictions and provide consistent evidence using a panel of foreign firms that list American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). We find significant shifts in the time-series properties of stock returns for firms that undergo large changes in disclosure environments, such as those cross-listing on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ and those from less-developed/emerging markets and code-law countries.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Goto, S., Watanabe, M., Xu, Y.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn013</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Strategic Disclosure and Stock Returns: Theory and Evidence from US Cross-Listing]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-20</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn027v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Multinationals as Arbitrageurs: The Effect of Stock Market Valuations on Foreign Direct Investment]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn027v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Empirical evidence of imperfect integration across world capital markets suggests a role for cross-border arbitrage by multinationals. Consistent with multinational arbitrage as a determinant of foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns, we find that FDI flows increase sharply with source-country stock market valuations&mdash;particularly the component of valuations that is predicted to revert the next year, and particularly in the presence of capital account restrictions that limit other mechanisms of cross-country arbitrage. The results suggest the existence of a cheap financial capital channel in which FDI flows reflect, in part, the use of relatively low-cost capital available to overvalued parents in the source country.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Baker, M., Foley, C. F., Wurgler, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-19</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn027</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Multinationals as Arbitrageurs: The Effect of Stock Market Valuations on Foreign Direct Investment]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn014v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Performance of Private Equity Funds]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn014v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>The performance of private equity funds as reported by industry associations and previous research is overstated. A large part of performance is driven by inflated accounting valuation of ongoing investments and we find a bias toward better performing funds in the data. We find an average net-of-fees fund performance of 3% per year below that of the S&amp;P 500. Adjusting for risk brings the underperformance to 6% per year. We estimate fees to be 6% per year. We discuss several misleading aspects of performance reporting and some side benefits as a first step toward an explanation.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Phalippou, L., Gottschalg, O.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-19</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn014</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Performance of Private Equity Funds]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn031v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[A GARCH Option Pricing Model with Filtered Historical Simulation]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn031v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We propose a new method for pricing options based on GARCH models with filtered historical innovations. In an incomplete market framework, we allow for different distributions of historical and pricing return dynamics, which enhances the model's flexibility to fit market option prices. An extensive empirical analysis based on S&amp;P 500 index options shows that our model outperforms other competing GARCH pricing models and <I>ad hoc</I> Black-Scholes models. We show that the flexible change of measure, the asymmetric GARCH volatility, and the nonparametric innovation distribution induce the accurate pricing performance of our model. Using a nonparametric approach, we obtain decreasing state-price densities per unit probability as suggested by economic theory and corroborating our GARCH pricing model. Implied volatility smiles appear to be explained by asymmetric volatility and negative skewness of filtered historical innovations.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Barone-Adesi, G., Engle, R. F., Mancini, L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-18</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn031</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A GARCH Option Pricing Model with Filtered Historical Simulation]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-18</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn016v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Estimation Risk, Information, and the Conditional CAPM: Theory and Evidence]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn016v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We theoretically and empirically investigate the role of information on the cross section of stock returns and firms' cost of capital when investors face estimation risk and learn from noisy signals of uncertain quality. The resultant equilibrium is an information-dependent conditional CAPM. We find strong empirical support for the model. Innovations in market volatility, oil prices, exchange rates, and dispersion of analysts' forecasts not only help explain the cross section of stock returns, but their influence depends on the stock's systematic estimation risk. Moreover, dividend and share repurchase initiations have significant downward announcement effects on estimated betas and their standard errors.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kumar, P., Sorescu, S. M., Boehme, R. D., Danielsen, B. R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn016</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Estimation Risk, Information, and the Conditional CAPM: Theory and Evidence]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-14</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn015v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Do Sovereign Bonds Benefit Corporate Bonds in Emerging Markets?]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn015v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We analyze the impact of emerging-market sovereign bonds on emerging-market corporate bonds by examining their spanning enhancement, price discovery, and issuance effects. We find that the effect of spanning enhancement is positive and large; over one-fifth of the information in corporate yield spreads is traced to innovations in sovereign bonds; and most of these effects are due to discovery and spanning of systematic risks. Further, issuance of sovereign bonds, controlling for endogeneity of market-timing decisions, lowers corporate yield and bid-ask spreads. Our results indicate that sovereign securities act as benchmarks and suggest they promote a vibrant corporate bond market.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dittmar, R. F., Yuan, K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn015</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Do Sovereign Bonds Benefit Corporate Bonds in Emerging Markets?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-14</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn012v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Loyalty-Based Portfolio Choice]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn012v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>I evaluate the effect of loyalty on individuals' portfolio choice using a unique dataset of retirement contributions. I exploit the statutory difference that, in 401(k) plans, stand-alone employees can invest directly in their division, while conglomerate employees must invest in the entire firm, including all unrelated divisions. Consistent with loyalty, employees of stand-alone firms invest 10 percentage points (75%) more in company stock than conglomerate employees. Support is also found using variation in loyalty between different groups of employees, across and within firms. The cost to employees of loyalty is large, amounting to nearly a 20% loss in retirement income.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cohen, L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-10</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn012</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Loyalty-Based Portfolio Choice]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-10</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn010v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Who Monitors the Monitor? The Effect of Board Independence on Executive Compensation and Firm Value]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn010v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Recent corporate governance reforms focus on the board's independence and encourage equity ownership by directors. We analyze the efficacy of these reforms in a model in which both adverse selection and moral hazard exist at the level of the firm's management. Delegating governance to the board improves monitoring but creates another agency problem because directors themselves avoid effort and are dependent on the CEO. We show that as directors become less dependent on the CEO, their monitoring efficiency may decrease even as they improve the incentive efficiency of executive compensation contracts. Therefore, a board composed of directors that are more independent may actually perform worse. Moreover, higher equity incentives for the board may increase equity-based compensation awards to management.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kumar, P., Sivaramakrishnan, K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-03</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn010</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Who Monitors the Monitor? The Effect of Board Independence on Executive Compensation and Firm Value]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-03</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn011v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Expected returns, yield spreads, and asset pricing tests]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn011v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We construct firm-specific measures of expected equity returns using corporate bond yields, and replace standard <I>ex post</I>average returns with our expected-return measures in asset pricing tests. We find that the market beta is significantly priced in the cross section of expected returns. The expected size and value premiums are positive and countercyclical, but there is no evidence of positive expected momentum profits.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Campello, M., Chen, L., Zhang, L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn011</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Expected returns, yield spreads, and asset pricing tests]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-02</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn003v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Are there permanent valuation gains to overseas listing?]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn003v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This paper tests whether foreign equity listings are associated with permanent valuation gains and examines how market and firm characteristics influence any valuation effects. Using a global sample of 1,676 listings placed in 25 countries, we find that much of the valuation gains to overseas listings are not permanent. The transitory nature of valuation gains holds for both average US listings and average first-time firm listings. We find little evidence of a permanent effect on returns for firms that list abroad, even for firms&rsquo; listings in markets that are more liquid, provide better legal protection, or have a larger shareholder base.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sarkissian, S., Schill, M. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn003</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Are there permanent valuation gains to overseas listing?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-02</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn005v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Y2K Options and the Liquidity Premium in Treasury Markets]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn005v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Financial institutions around the world expected the millennium date change (Y2K) to cause an <I>aggregate</I> liquidity shortage. Responding to the concern, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York auctioned Y2K options to primary dealers. The options gave the dealers the right to borrow from the Fed at a predetermined interest rate. Using the implied volatilities of Y2K options and the on/off-the-run spread, we demonstrate that the Fed's action eased the fears of bond dealers, contributing to a drop in the liquidity premium of Treasury securities. Our analysis shows the link between the microstructure of government debt markets and the central bank's provision of liquidity. We argue that Y2K options and their effects on liquidity premium broadly conform to the economic theory on public provision of private liquidity.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sundaresan, S., Wang, Z.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-28</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn005</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Y2K Options and the Liquidity Premium in Treasury Markets]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-28</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn004v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Spline-GARCH Model for Low-Frequency Volatility and Its Global Macroeconomic Causes]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn004v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Twenty-five years of volatility research has left the macroeconomic environment playing a minor role. This paper proposes modeling equity volatilities as a combination of macro- economic effects and time series dynamics. High-frequency return volatility is specified to be the product of a slow-moving component, represented by an exponential spline, and a unit GARCH. This slow-moving component is the low-frequency volatility, which in this model coincides with the unconditional volatility. This component is estimated for nearly 50 countries over various sample periods of daily data. Low-frequency volatility is then modeled as a function of macroeconomic and financial variables in an unbalanced panel with a variety of dependence structures. It is found to vary over time and across countries. The low-frequency component of volatility is greater when the macroeconomic factors of GDP, inflation, and short-term interest rates are more volatile or when inflation is high and output growth is low. Volatility is higher not only for emerging markets and markets with small numbers of listed companies and market capitalization relative to GDP, but also for large economies. The model allows long horizon forecasts of volatility to depend on macroeconomic developments, and delivers estimates of the volatility to be anticipated in a newly opened market.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Engle, R. F., Rangel, J. G.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-28</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn004</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Spline-GARCH Model for Low-Frequency Volatility and Its Global Macroeconomic Causes]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-28</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn009v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Mispricing of S&P 500 Index Options]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhn009v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Widespread violations of stochastic dominance by 1-month S&amp;P 500 index call options over 1986&ndash;2006 imply that a trader can improve expected utility by engaging in a zero-net-cost trade net of transaction costs and bid-ask spread. Although precrash option prices conform to the Black-Scholes-Merton model reasonably well, they are incorrectly priced if the distribution of the index return is estimated from time-series data. Substantial violations by postcrash OTM calls contradict the notion that the problem lies primarily with the left-hand tail of the index return distribution and that the smile is too steep. The decrease in violations over the postcrash period of 1988&ndash;1995 is followed by a substantial increase over 1997&ndash;2006, which may be due to the lower quality of the data but, in any case, does not provide evidence that the options market is becoming more rational over time.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Constantinides, G. M., Jackwerth, J. C., Perrakis, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-21</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhn009</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Mispricing of S&P 500 Index Options]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-21</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm088v2?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Flight-to-Quality or Flight-to-Liquidity? Evidence from the Euro-Area Bond Market]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm088v2?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Do bond investors demand credit quality or liquidity? The answer is both, but at different times and for different reasons. Using data on the Euro-area government bond market, which features a unique negative correlation between credit quality and liquidity across countries, we show that the bulk of sovereign yield spreads is explained by differences in credit quality, though liquidity plays a nontrivial role, especially for low credit risk countries and during times of heightened market uncertainty. In contrast, the destination of large flows into the bond market is determined almost exclusively by liquidity. We conclude that credit quality matters for bond valuation but that, in times of market stress, investors chase liquidity, not credit quality.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Beber, A., Brandt, M. W., Kavajecz, K. A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-11</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm088</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Flight-to-Quality or Flight-to-Liquidity? Evidence from the Euro-Area Bond Market]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-11</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm086v2?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Equity and Cash in Intercorporate Asset Sales: Theory and Evidence]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm086v2?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We develop a two-sided asymmetric information model of asset sales that incorporates the key differences from mergers and allows the information held by each party to be impounded in the transaction. The buyer's information is conveyed through a first-stage competitive auction. A seller with unfavorable information about the asset accepts the cash offer of the highest bidder. A seller with favorable information proposes a take-it-or-leave-it counteroffer that entails buyer equity. Thus, the cash-equity decision reflects the seller's but not the buyer's information in contrast to the theoretical and empirical findings for mergers. The central prediction of our model is that there are large gains in wealth for both buyers and sellers in equity-based asset sales, whereas cash sales generate significantly smaller gains that typically accrue only to sellers. Our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hege, U., Lovo, S., Slovin, M. B., Sushka, M. E.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-01-12</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm086</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Equity and Cash in Intercorporate Asset Sales: Theory and Evidence]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-12</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm083v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Failure Is an Option: Impediments to Short Selling and Options Prices]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm083v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Regulations allow market makers to short sell without borrowing stock, and the transactions of a major options market maker show that in most hard-to-borrow situations, it chooses not to borrow and instead fails to deliver stock to its buyers. A part of the value of failing passes through to options prices: when failing is cheaper than borrowing, the relation between borrowing costs and options prices is significantly weaker. The remaining value is profit to the market maker, and its ability to profit despite competition between market makers appears to result from the cost advantage of larger market makers.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Evans, R. B., Geczy, C. C., Musto, D. K., Reed, A. V.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-01-05</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm083</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Failure Is an Option: Impediments to Short Selling and Options Prices]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-05</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm087v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Controlling for Fixed-Income Exposure in Portfolio Evaluation: Evidence from Hybrid Mutual Funds]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm087v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We examine whether explicitly controlling for the fixed-income exposure of mutual funds affects conclusions drawn in performance assessment. We focus on daily return data from two hybrid mutual fund samples. Comparing abnormal performance estimates from the Carhart (1997) model to extensions designed to correct for bond holdings, we find that the estimates within one of our samples change from positive to significantly negative. Additional evidence indicates that cash flows to the funds are more closely correlated with the traditional Carhart measure, clearly indicating that the absence of bond indices misleads investors who use a fund's risk-adjusted performance as the basis for investment decisions.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Comer, G., Larrymore, N., Rodriguez, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm087</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Controlling for Fixed-Income Exposure in Portfolio Evaluation: Evidence from Hybrid Mutual Funds]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-20</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm085v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Cointegration and Consumption Risks in Asset Returns]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm085v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We argue that the cointegrating relation between dividends and consumption, a measure of long-run consumption risks, is a key determinant of risk premia at all investment horizons. As the investment horizon increases, transitory risks disappear, and the asset's beta is dominated by long-run consumption risks. We show that the return betas, derived from the cointegration-based VAR (EC-VAR) model, successfully account for the cross-sectional variation in equity returns at both short and long horizons; however, this is not the case when the cointegrating restriction is ignored. Our evidence highlights the importance of cointegration-based long-run consumption risks for financial markets.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bansal, R., Dittmar, R., Kiku, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm085</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Cointegration and Consumption Risks in Asset Returns]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-20</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm067v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Robust Stochastic Discount Factors]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm067v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>When the market is incomplete, a new non-redundant derivative security cannot be priced by no-arbitrage arguments alone. Moreover, there will be a multiplicity of stochastic discount factors and each of them may give a different price for the new derivative security. This paper develops an approach to the selection of a stochastic discount factor for pricing a new derivative security. The approach is based on the idea that the price of a derivative security should not vary too much when the payoff of the primitive security is slightly perturbed, i.e., the price of the derivative should be robust to model misspecification. The paper develops two metrics of robustness. The first is based on robustness in expectation. The second is based on robustness in probability and draws on tools from the theory of large deviations. We show that in a stochastic volatility model, the two metrics yield analytically tractable bounds for the derivative price, as the underlying stochastic volatility model is perturbed. The bounds can be readily used for numerical examination of the sensitivity of the price of the derivative to model misspecification.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Boyle, P., Feng, S., Tian, W., Wang, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-13</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm067</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Robust Stochastic Discount Factors]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-13</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm058v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The New Issues Puzzle: Testing the Investment-Based Explanation]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm058v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>An investment factor, long in low-investment stocks and short in high-investment stocks, helps explain the new issues puzzle. Adding the investment factor into standard factor regressions reduces the SEO underperformance by about 75%, the IPO underperformance by 80%, the underperformance following convertible debt offerings by 50%, and Daniel and Titman's (<cross-ref type="bib" refid="hhm058R20">2006</cross-ref>) composite issuance effect by 40%. The reason is that issuers invest more than nonissuers, and the investment factor earns a significantly positive average return of 0.57% per month.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lyandres, E., Sun, L., Zhang, L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-12</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm058</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The New Issues Puzzle: Testing the Investment-Based Explanation]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-12</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm076v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Effect of Introducing a Non-Redundant Derivative on the Volatility of Stock-Market Returns When Agents Differ in Risk Aversion]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm076v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We study the effect of introducing a nonredundant derivative on the volatilities of the stock market return and the locally risk-free interest rate. Our analysis uses a standard, frictionless, full-information, dynamic, continuous-time, general-equilibrium, Lucas endowment economy in which there are two classes of agents who have time-additive power utility functions and differ only in their risk aversion. Our main result is to show analytically that if the intensity of the precautionary demand for savings is not too high, then the introduction of a nonredundant derivative <I>increases</I> the volatility of stock market returns. Furthermore, in the economy with the derivative, the volatility of stock market returns can be substantially greater than that of aggregate dividend growth (fundamental volatility). We also show that the volatility of the locally risk-free interest rate increases with the introduction of the derivative.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bhamra, H. S., Uppal, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-11</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm076</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Effect of Introducing a Non-Redundant Derivative on the Volatility of Stock-Market Returns When Agents Differ in Risk Aversion]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-11</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm073v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Market Valuation and Acquisition Quality: Empirical Evidence]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm073v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Existing research shows that significantly more acquisitions occur when stock markets are booming than when markets are depressed. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (<cross-ref type="bib" refid="hhm073r43">2004</cross-ref>) hypothesize that firm-specific and market-wide valuations lead to an excess of mergers, and these will be value destroying. This article investigates whether acquisitions occurring during booming markets are fundamentally different from those occurring during depressed markets. We find that acquirers buying during high-valuation markets have significantly higher announcement returns but lower long-run abnormal stock and operating performance than those buying during low-valuation markets. We investigate possible explanations for the long-run underperformance and conclude it is consistent with managerial herding.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bouwman, C. H. S., Fuller, K., Nain, A. S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-11</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm073</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Market Valuation and Acquisition Quality: Empirical Evidence]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-11</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm061v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Real Effects of Debt Certification: Evidence from the Introduction of Bank Loan Ratings]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm061v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>I examine the introduction of syndicated bank loan ratings by Moody's and Standard &amp; Poor's in 1995 to evaluate whether third-party rating agencies affect firm financial and investment policy. The introduction of bank loan ratings leads to an increase in the use of debt by firms that obtain a rating, and also increases in firms' asset growth, cash acquisitions, and investment in working capital. Consistent with a causal effect of the ratings, the increase in debt usage and investment is concentrated in the set of borrowers who are of lower credit quality and do not have an issuer credit rating before 1995. A loan-level analysis demonstrates that previously unrated borrowers who obtain a loan rating gain increased access to the capital of less-informed investors. The results suggest that third-party debt certification has real effects on firm investment policy.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sufi, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-11</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm061</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Real Effects of Debt Certification: Evidence from the Introduction of Bank Loan Ratings]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-11</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm074v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Reconciling the Return Predictability Evidence]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm074v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Evidence of stock-return predictability by financial ratios is still controversial, as documented by inconsistent results for in-sample and out-of-sample regressions and by substantial parameter instability. This article shows that these seemingly incompatible results can be reconciled if the assumption of a fixed steady state mean of the economy is relaxed. We find strong empirical evidence in support of shifts in the steady state and propose simple methods to adjust financial ratios for such shifts. The in-sample forecasting relationship of adjusted price ratios and future returns is statistically significant and stable over time. In real time, however, changes in the steady state make the in-sample return forecastability hard to exploit out-of-sample. The uncertainty of estimating the size of steady-state shifts rather than the estimation of their dates is responsible for the difficulty of forecasting stock returns in real time. Our conclusions hold for a variety of financial ratios and are robust to changes in the econometric technique used to estimate shifts in the steady state.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lettau, M., Van Nieuwerburgh, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-10</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm074</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Reconciling the Return Predictability Evidence]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-10</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm069v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm069v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article offers evidence on the ownership concentration at a representative sample of U.S. public firms. Ninety-six percent of these firms have blockholders; these blockholders in aggregate own an average 39% of the common stock. The ownership of U.S. firms is similar to and by some measures more concentrated than the ownership of firms in other countries. These findings challenge current thinking on a number of issues, ranging from the nature of the agency conflict in domestic corporations to the relationship between ownership concentration and legal protections for investors around the world.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Holderness, C. G.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-10</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm069</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-10</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm056v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Jumps in Financial Markets: A New Nonparametric Test and Jump Dynamics]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm056v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article introduces a new nonparametric test to detect jump arrival times and realized jump sizes in asset prices up to the intra-day level. We demonstrate that the likelihood of misclassification of jumps becomes negligible when we use high-frequency returns. Using our test, we examine jump dynamics and their distributions in the U.S. equity markets. The results show that individual stock jumps are associated with prescheduled earnings announcements and other company-specific news events. Additionally, S&amp;P 500 Index jumps are associated with general market news announcements. This suggests different pricing models for individual equity options versus index options.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lee, S. S., Mykland, P. A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-09</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm056</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Jumps in Financial Markets: A New Nonparametric Test and Jump Dynamics]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-09</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm054v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Time-Varying Liquidity Risk and the Cross Section of Stock Returns]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm054v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This paper studies whether stock returns' sensitivities to aggregate liquidity fluctuations and the pricing of liquidity risk vary over time. We find that liquidity betas vary across two distinct states: one with high liquidity betas and the other with low betas. The high liquidity-beta state is short lived and characterized by heavy trade, high volatility, and a wide cross-sectional dispersion in liquidity betas. It also delivers a disproportionately large liquidity risk premium, amounting to more than twice the value premium. Our results are consistent with a model of liquidity risk in which investors face uncertainty about their trading counterparties' preferences.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Watanabe, A., Watanabe, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-09</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm054</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Time-Varying Liquidity Risk and the Cross Section of Stock Returns]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-09</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm078v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Resolution of Bank Failures]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm078v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>As the number of bank failures increases, the set of assets available for acquisition by surviving banks enlarges but the total liquidity available with surviving banks falls. This results in "cash-in-the-market" pricing for liquidation of banking assets. At a sufficiently large number of bank failures, and in turn, at a sufficiently low level of asset prices, there are too many banks to liquidate and inefficient users of assets who are liquidity-endowed may end up owning the liquidated assets. In order to avoid this allocation inefficiency, it may be ex-post optimal for the regulator to bail out some failed banks. We show, however, that there exists a policy that involves granting liquidity to surviving banks in the purchase of failed banks, which is equivalent to the bailout policy from an ex-post standpoint. Crucially, this liquidity provision policy gives banks incentives to differentiate, rather than to herd, makes aggregate banking crises less likely, and thereby dominates the bailout policy from an ex-ante standpoint.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Acharya, V. V., Yorulmazer, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-05</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm078</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Resolution of Bank Failures]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-05</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm062v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Causal Effect of Mortgage Refinancing on Interest Rate Volatility: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Implications]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm062v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article investigates the effects of mortgage-backed security (MBS) hedging activity on interest rate volatility and proposes a model that takes these effects into account. An empirical examination suggests that the inclusion of information about MBSs considerably improves model performance in pricing interest rate options and in forecasting future interest rate volatility. The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that MBS hedging affects the interest rate volatility implied by both options and the actual interest rate volatility. The results also indicate that the inclusion of information about the MBS universe may result in models that better describe the price of fixed-income securities.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Duarte, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-04</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm062</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Causal Effect of Mortgage Refinancing on Interest Rate Volatility: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Implications]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-04</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm075v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Optimal Versus Naive Diversification: How Inefficient is the 1/N Portfolio Strategy?]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm075v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the sample-based mean-variance model, and its extensions designed to reduce estimation error, relative to the naive 1/<I>N</I> portfolio. Of the 14 models we evaluate across seven empirical datasets, none is consistently better than the 1/<I>N</I> rule in terms of Sharpe ratio, certainty-equivalent return, or turnover, which indicates that, out of sample, the gain from optimal diversification is more than offset by estimation error. Based on parameters calibrated to the US equity market, our analytical results and simulations show that the estimation window needed for the sample-based mean-variance strategy and its extensions to outperform the 1/<I>N</I> benchmark is around 3000 months for a portfolio with 25 assets and about 6000 months for a portfolio with 50 assets. This suggests that there are still many "miles to go" before the gains promised by optimal portfolio choice can actually be realized out of sample.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[DeMiguel, V., Garlappi, L., Uppal, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-03</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm075</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Optimal Versus Naive Diversification: How Inefficient is the 1/N Portfolio Strategy?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-03</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm055v2?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Predicting Excess Stock Returns Out of Sample: Can Anything Beat the Historical Average?]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm055v2?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Goyal and Welch (<cross-ref type="bib" refid="hhm055r28">2007</cross-ref>) argue that the historical average excess stock return forecasts future excess stock returns better than regressions of excess returns on predictor variables. In this article, we show that many predictive regressions beat the historical average return, once weak restrictions are imposed on the signs of coefficients and return forecasts. The out-of-sample explanatory power is small, but nonetheless is economically meaningful for mean-variance investors. Even better results can be obtained by imposing the restrictions of steady-state valuation models, thereby removing the need to estimate the average from a short sample of volatile stock returns.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Campbell, J. Y., Thompson, S. B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-11-22</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm055</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Predicting Excess Stock Returns Out of Sample: Can Anything Beat the Historical Average?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-11-22</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm060v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Managing Bank Liquidity Risk: How Deposit-Loan Synergies Vary with Market Conditions]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm060v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Liquidity risk in banking has been attributed to transactions deposits and their potential to spark runs or panics. We show instead that transactions deposits help banks hedge liquidity risk from unused loan commitments. Bank stock-return volatility increases with unused commitments, but only for banks with low levels of transactions deposits. This deposit-lending hedge becomes more powerful during periods of tight liquidity, when nervous investors move funds into their banks. Our results reverse the standard notion of liquidity risk at banks, where runs from depositors had been seen as the cause of trouble.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gatev, E., Schuermann, T., Strahan, P. E.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-11-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm060</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Managing Bank Liquidity Risk: How Deposit-Loan Synergies Vary with Market Conditions]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-11-20</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm052v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Excess Comovement of Stock Returns: Evidence from Cross-Sectional Variation in Nikkei 225 Weights]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm052v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Relative to their weights in a value-weighted index, a number of stocks in Japan's Nikkei 225 stock index are overweighted by a factor of 10 or more. I document a strong positive relation between overweighting and the comovement of a stock with other stocks in the Nikkei index, and a negative relationship between index overweighting and comovement with stocks outside of the index. The cross-sectional approach resolves endogeneity problems associated with event study demonstrations of excess comovement. A trading strategy that bets on the reversion of stock prices of overweighted stocks generates economic profits, confirming that the observed comovement patterns are excessive, and providing further evidence that comovement of stock returns can be a consequence of commonality in trading behavior.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Greenwood, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-10-17</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm052</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Excess Comovement of Stock Returns: Evidence from Cross-Sectional Variation in Nikkei 225 Weights]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-10-17</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm051v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Interpreting the Value Effect Through the Q-Theory: An Empirical Investigation]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm051v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article interprets the well-known value effect through the implications of standard Q-theory. An investment growth factor, defined as the difference in returns between low-investment stocks and high-investment stocks, contains information similar to the Fama and French (<cross-ref type="bib" refid="B11">1993</cross-ref>) value factor (<I>HML</I>), and can explain the value effect about as well as <I>HML</I>. In the cross-section, portfolios of firms with low investment growth rates (IGRs) or low investment-to-capital ratios have significantly higher average returns than those with high IGRs or high investment-to-capital ratios. The value effect largely disappears after controlling for investment, and the investment effect is robust against controls for the marginal product of capital. These results are consistent with the predictions of a standard Q-theory model with a stochastic discount factor.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Xing, Y.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-28</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm051</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Interpreting the Value Effect Through the Q-Theory: An Empirical Investigation]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-09-28</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm046v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Dog That Did Not Bark: A Defense of Return Predictability]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm046v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>If returns are not predictable, dividend growth must be predictable, to generate the observed variation in divided yields. I find that the <I>absence</I> of dividend growth predictability gives stronger evidence than does the <I>presence</I> of return predictability. Long-horizon return forecasts give the same strong evidence. These tests exploit the negative correlation of return forecasts with dividend-yield autocorrelation across samples, together with sensible upper bounds on dividend-yield autocorrelation, to deliver more powerful statistics. I reconcile my findings with the literature that finds poor power in long-horizon return forecasts, and with the literature that notes the poor out-of-sample <I>R</I><sup>2</sup> of return-forecasting regressions.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cochrane, J. H.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-22</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm046</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Dog That Did Not Bark: A Defense of Return Predictability]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-09-22</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm042v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Trade-offs in Staying Close: Corporate Decision Making and Geographic Dispersion]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm042v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We investigate whether the geographic dispersion of a firm affects corporate decision making. Our findings suggest that social factors work alongside informational considerations to make geography important to corporate decisions. We show that (i) geographically dispersed firms are less employee friendly; (ii) dismissals of divisional employees are less common in divisions located closer to corporate headquarters; and (iii) firms appear to adopt a "pecking order" and divest out-of-state entities before those in-state. To explain these findings, we consider both information and social factors. We find that firms are more likely to protect proximate employees in soft information industries (i.e., when information is difficult to transfer over long distances). However, employee protection holds only when the headquarters is located in a less populated county, suggesting a role for social factors. Additionally, stock markets respond favorably to divestitures of in-state divisions.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Landier, A., Nair, V. B., Wulf, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm042</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Trade-offs in Staying Close: Corporate Decision Making and Geographic Dispersion]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-09-20</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm035v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Learning and Asset Prices Under Ambiguous Information]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm035v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>In a Lucas exchange economy with standard power utility, we study asset prices under learning and ambiguous information. In contrast with models featuring only learning or ambiguity, our model is successful in matching the equity premium, the interest rate, and the volatility of stock returns under empirically reasonable parameters. Our closed-form formulas also show that a severe downward bias arises in the empirical relation between stock returns and return volatility. We quantify this bias in simulations and show that our model can explain why such a relation is difficult to detect in the data.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Leippold, M., Trojani, F., Vanini, P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-12</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm035</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Learning and Asset Prices Under Ambiguous Information]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-09-12</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm044v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Dating Game: Do Managers Designate Option Grant Dates to Increase their Compensation?]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm044v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We provide evidence of two variants of a dating game that entails picking a grant date <I>ex post</I>, that is, after the board's compensation decision is made: back-dating (picking a date before the board decision date), and forward-dating (waiting after the board decision date to observe the stock price behavior). Consistent with back-dating, we find stock return behavior around the grant date to be positively related to reporting lag. In the promptly reported sample, we find stock return behavior and the pattern of reporting lags consistent with forward-dating. Our calculations show that managers can obtain economically significant benefits by playing the dating game.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Narayanan, M. P., Seyhun, H. N.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-11</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm044</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Dating Game: Do Managers Designate Option Grant Dates to Increase their Compensation?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-09-11</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm041v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Inflation Uncertainty, Asset Valuations, and the Credit Spreads Puzzle]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm041v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Investors' learning of the state of future real fundamentals from current inflation leads to macroeconomic state dependence of asset valuations and solvency ratios of firms within given rating categories. Since credit spreads are convex functions of solvency ratios, average spreads are higher than spreads at average solvency ratios. Macroeconomic shocks carry risk premiums so that expected default losses are more sensitive to changes in the price of risk than are credit spreads. By incorporating state dependence and increasing the price of risk, the econometrician obtains high credit spreads while maintaining average default losses at historical levels&mdash;the credit spreads puzzle.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[David, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-08-31</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm041</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Inflation Uncertainty, Asset Valuations, and the Credit Spreads Puzzle]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-08-31</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm036v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Shareholder Diversification and the Decision to Go Public]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm036v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We study the effects of the controlling shareholders' portfolio diversification on the initial public offering (IPO) process. Less diversified shareholders have more to gain from taking their firm public, and are more willing to accept a lower price for shares. We test these hypotheses using the data on all IPOs in Sweden between 1995 and 2001. Using detailed information on the portfolio composition of shareholders in private and public firms, we construct several proxies of their portfolio diversification and relate them to the probability of the IPO and the underpricing. We show that the less diversified individual shareholders, especially those with lower wealth, sell more of their shares at the IPO. Firms held by less diversified controlling shareholders are more likely to go public, and exhibit higher underpricing. These effects are economically and statistically significant, while the diversification of noncontrolling shareholders has no effect. Our findings suggest that diversification of controlling shareholders plays a prominent role in the IPO process.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bodnaruk, A., Kandel, E., Massa, M., Simonov, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-08-30</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm036</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Shareholder Diversification and the Decision to Go Public]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-08-30</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm024v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Financial Analysts' Performance: Sector versus Country Specialization]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm024v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Brokerage houses normally structure their research activities along either country or sector lines. I investigate whether organizational structure affects the quality of financial analysts' earnings forecasts. Specifically, I compare the performance of country-specialized financial analysts with that of sector-specialized financial analysts. The former issue forecasts considerably more accurately than the latter. Country specialists benefit from an informational advantage over sector specialists. A superior knowledge of country-specific factors, as well as geographical proximity between analysts and the firms they cover, are significant determinants of this advantage.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sonney, F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-05-16</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm024</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Financial Analysts' Performance: Sector versus Country Specialization]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-05-16</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm020v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Declining Equity Premium: What Role Does Macroeconomic Risk Play?]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm020v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Aggregate stock prices, relative to virtually any indicator of fundamental value, soared to unprecedented levels in the 1990s. Even today, after the market declines since 2000, they remain well above historical norms. Why? We consider one particular explanation: a fall in <I>macroeconomic</I> <I>risk</I>, or the volatility of the aggregate economy. Empirically, we find a strong correlation between low frequency movements in macroeconomic volatility and low frequency movements in the stock market. To model this phenomenon, we estimate a two-state regime switching model for the volatility and mean of consumption growth, and find evidence of a shift to substantially lower consumption volatility at the beginning of the 1990s. We then use these estimates from post-war data to calibrate a rational asset pricing model with regime switches in both the mean and standard deviation of consumption growth. Plausible parameterizations of the model are found to account for a significant portion of the run-up in asset valuation ratios observed in the late 1990s. JEL: G12</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lettau, M., Ludvigson, S. C., Wachter, J. A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-04-12</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm020</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Declining Equity Premium: What Role Does Macroeconomic Risk Play?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-04-12</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm018v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Good IPOs draw in bad: Inelastic banking capacity and hot markets]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm018v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We posit that screening IPOs requires specialized labor which is in fixed supply. A sudden increase in demand for IPO financing increases the compensation of IPO screening labor. This results in reduced screening, encouraging sub-marginal firms to enter the IPO market, further fueling the demand for screening labor. The model's conclusions are consistent with empirical findings of increased underpricing during hot markets, positive correlation between issue volume and underpricing, and with tipping points between hot and cold markets. Finally, the model makes sharp predictions relating the IPO market to fundamental values of firms and to investment banking returns. (JEL codes: G20, G24)</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Khanna, N., Noe, T. H., Sonti, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-04-12</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm018</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Good IPOs draw in bad: Inelastic banking capacity and hot markets]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-04-12</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm017v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Financial Constraints and Growth: Multinational and Local Firm Responses to Currency Depreciations]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm017v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This paper examines how financial constraints and product market exposures determine the response of multinational and local firms to sharp depreciations. U.S. multinational affiliates increase sales, assets, and investment significantly more than local firms during, and subsequent to, depreciations. Differing product market exposures do not explain these differences in performance. Instead, a differential ability to circumvent financial constraints is a significant determinant of the observed differences in investment responses. Multinational affiliates also access parent equity when local firms are most constrained. These results indicate another role for foreign direct investment in emerging markets&mdash;multinational affiliates expand economic activity during currency crises when local firms are most constrained. <I>JEL Classifications:</I> F23, F31, G15, G31, G32.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Desai, M. A., Foley, C. F., Forbes, K. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-03-17</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm017</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Financial Constraints and Growth: Multinational and Local Firm Responses to Currency Depreciations]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-03-17</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm016v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm016v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We argue that earnings management and fraudulent accounting have important economic consequences. In a model where the costs of earnings management are endogenous, we show that in equilibrium, low productivity firms hire and invest too much in order to pool with high productivity firms. This behavior distorts the allocation of economic resources in the economy. We test the predictions of the model using firm-level data. We show that during periods of suspicious accounting, firms hire and invest excessively, while managers exercise options. When the misreporting is detected, firms shed labor and capital and productivity improves. Our firm-level results hold both before and after the market crash of 2000. In the aggregate, our model provides a novel explanation for periods of jobless and investment-less growth.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kedia, S., Philippon, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-03-17</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm016</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-03-17</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm014v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[A Comprehensive Look at The Empirical Performance of Equity Premium Prediction]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm014v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Our paper comprehensively reexamines the performance of variables that have been suggested by the academic literature to be good predictors of the equity premium. We find that by and large, these models have predicted poorly both in-sample and out-of-sample for thirty years now; these models seem unstable, as diagnosed by their out-of-sample predictions and other statistics; and these models would not have helped an investor with access only to available information to profitably time the market. <b>JEL Classifications:</b> G12, G14.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Goyal, A., Welch, I.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-03-17</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhm014</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A Comprehensive Look at The Empirical Performance of Equity Premium Prediction]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-03-17</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm007v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Bank Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical Analysis]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm007v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>I empirically examine the factors that determine whether firms use bank lines of credit or cash in corporate liquidity management. I find that bank lines of credit, also known as revolving credit facilities, are a viable liquidity substitute only for firms that maintain high cash flow. In contrast, firms with low cash flow are less likely to obtain a line of credit, and they rely more heavily on cash in their corporate liquidity management. An important channel for this correlation is the use of cash flow-based financial covenants by banks that supply credit lines. I find that firms must maintain high cash flow to remain compliant with covenants, and banks restrict firm access to credit facilities in response to covenant violations. Using the cash flow sensitivity of cash as a measure of financial constraints, I provide evidence that lack of access to a line of credit is a more statistically powerful measure of financial constraints than traditional measures used in the literature.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sufi, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-01-31</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/revfin/hhm007</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Bank Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical Analysis]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-01-31</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm005v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Monopoly and Information Advantage in the Residential Mortgage Market*]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhm005v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Information advantage and entry deterrence incentives are investigated as they affect lending outcomes and competitive structure of the U.S. residential mortgage market. In the model, when assessing a loan applicant, the incumbent monopoly lender employs a proprietary screening technology to produce a privately observed estimate of loan credit quality. When faced with potential competitive entry, the incumbent signals poor credit quality by charging high prices to higher quality borrowers. Market structure and loan pricing strategy are derived endogenously, where the incumbent deters entry by first segmenting consumers into prime and sub-prime loan markets and second by charging prime market borrowers a uniform rate that is higher than the risk-based monopoly rate. Empirical implications of the model are identified, and evidence is presented that is consistent with predictions.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gan, J., Riddiough, T. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-01-29</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/revfin/hhm005</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Monopoly and Information Advantage in the Residential Mortgage Market*]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-01-29</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl046v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Institutional Investors and Equity Returns: Are Short-term Institutions Better Informed?]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl046v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We show that the positive relation between institutional ownership and future stock returns documented in Gompers and Metrick (2001) is driven by short-term institutions. Furthermore, short-term institutions' trading forecasts future stock returns. This predictability does not reverse in the long run and is stronger for small and growth stocks. Short-term institutions' trading is also positively related to future earnings surprises. By contrast, long-term institutions' trading does not forecast future returns, nor is it related to future earnings news. Our results are consistent with the view that short-term institutions are better informed and they trade actively to exploit their informational advantage.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Yan, X., Zhang, Z.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-01-03</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/revfin/hhl046</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Institutional Investors and Equity Returns: Are Short-term Institutions Better Informed?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-01-03</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl045v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Hedge Funds as Investors of Last Resort?]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl045v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Hedge funds have become important investors in public companies raising equity privately. Hedge funds tend to finance companies that have poor fundamentals and pronounced information asymmetries. To compensate for these shortcomings, hedge funds protect themselves by requiring substantial discounts, negotiating repricing rights, and entering into short positions of the underlying stocks. We find that companies that obtain financing from hedge funds significantly underperform companies that obtain financing from other investors during the following two years. We argue that hedge funds are investors of last resort and provide funding for companies that are otherwise constrained from raising equity capital.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brophy, D. J., Ouimet, P. P., Sialm, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2006-11-13</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhl045</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Hedge Funds as Investors of Last Resort?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2006-11-13</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl044v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Default Risk, Shareholder Advantage, and Stock Returns*]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl044v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This paper examines the relationship between default probability and stock returns. Using the <I>Expected Default Frequency</I><SUP>TM</SUP> (EDF<SUP>TM</SUP>) of <I>Moody's KMV</I>, we document that higher default probabilities <I>are not</I> associated with higher expected stock returns. Within a model of bargaining between equity-holders and debt-holders in default, we show that the relationship between default probability and equity return is (i) upward sloping for firms where shareholders can extract little benefit from renegotiation (low "shareholder advantage") and (ii) humped and downward sloping for firms with high shareholder advantage. This dichotomy implies that distressed firms with stronger shareholder advantage should exhibit lower expected returns in the cross-section. Our empirical evidence, based on several proxies for shareholder advantage, is consistent with the model's predictions.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Garlappi, L., Shu, T., Yan, H.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2006-10-31</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhl044</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Default Risk, Shareholder Advantage, and Stock Returns*]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2006-10-31</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl043v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Asset Returns and the Listing Choice of Firms]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl043v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We propose a mechanism that relates asset returns to the firm's optimal listing choice. We use a theoretical model to show that a stock will be more liquid when it is listed on a market where "similar" securities are traded. We empirically examine the implications of our model using NYSE and Nasdaq securities. We find that the return patterns of stocks that switch markets become more similar to the return patterns of securities listed on the new market prior to the switch. Stocks that are eligible to switch but stay put are more similar to securities listed on their market than to securities listed on the other market. Our results suggest that managers make listing decisions that enhance the liquidity of their firms' stocks.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Baruch, S., Saar, G.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2006-10-25</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhl043</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Asset Returns and the Listing Choice of Firms]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2006-10-25</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl042v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Myth of Long-Horizon Predictability]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl042v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>The prevailing view in finance is that the evidence for long-horizon stock return predictability is significantly stronger than that for short horizons. We show that for persistent regressors, a characteristic of most of the predictive variables used in the literature, the estimators are almost perfectly correlated across horizons under the null hypothesis of no predictability. For the persistence levels of dividend yields, the analytical correlation is 99% between the 1- and 2-year horizon estimators and 94% between the 1- and 5-year horizons. Common sampling error across equations leads to ordinary least squares coefficient estimates and <I>R</I><SUP>2</SUP>s that are roughly proportional to the horizon under the null hypothesis. This is the precise pattern found in the data. We perform joint tests across horizons for a variety of explanatory variables and provide an alternative view of the existing evidence.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Boudoukh, J., Richardson, M., Whitelaw, R. F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2006-10-25</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhl042</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Myth of Long-Horizon Predictability]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2006-10-25</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl041v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Unobserved Actions of Mutual Funds]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl041v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Despite extensive disclosure requirements, mutual fund investors do not observe all actions of fund managers. We estimate the impact of unobserved actions on fund returns using the return gap - the difference between the reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings. We document that unobserved actions of some funds persistently create value, while such actions of other funds destroy value. Our main result shows that the return gap predicts fund performance.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kacperczyk, M., Sialm, C., Zheng, L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2006-10-25</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhl041</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Unobserved Actions of Mutual Funds]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2006-10-25</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl040v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Information Quality and Options]]></title>
<link>http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/hhl040v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Microstructure researchers have long understood that information quality has an effect on price formation in the underlying asset market. However, option researchers have largely ignored the fact that information quality might also impact the options market. This article characterizes the nature of the impact by showing how option prices and implied volatility levels are related to the forward looking information quality path. This result follows from a noisy rational expectations model that abandons the normal distribution in favor of the gamma distribution, but maintains the standard assumption of exponential utility. Thus the new model bridges the gap
between the microstructure literature that relies so heavily on the normal-exponential framework, and the options literature that relies exclusively on models that are consistent with the limited liability of stock prices. The model's tractability allows for a robustness check against the standard framework and provides a viable setting for analyzing the empirical implications of information quality for the options market.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Vanden*, J. M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2006-10-25</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhl040</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Information Quality and Options]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Society for Financial Studies</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2006-10-25</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Article</pris