Review of Financial Studies - Advance Access

Expected Returns and the Business Cycle: Heterogeneous Goods and Time-Varying Risk Aversion

Lochstoer, L. A. — 2009-06-30

This paper proposes a representative agent habit-formation model where preferences are defined for both luxury goods and basic goods. The model matches the equity risk premium, risk-free rate, and volatilities. From the intratemporal first-order condition, one can substitute out basic good consumption and the habit level, yielding a stochastic discount factor driven by two observable risk factors: luxury good consumption and the relative price of the two goods. I estimate these processes and find them to be heteroskedastic, implying time variation in the conditional volatility of the stochastic discount factor. These dynamics occur both at the business cycle frequency and at a lower, "generational" frequency. The findings reveal that the time variation in aggregate stock market and Treasury bond risk premiums are consistent with the predictions of the model.

Dynamic Asset Allocation: Portfolio Decomposition Formula and Applications

Detemple, J., Rindisbacher, M. — 2009-06-10

A new decomposition of the optimal portfolio, in dynamic models with von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences and Ito prices, is established. The formula rests on a change of numéraire that uses pure discount bonds as units of account. The dynamic hedging demand has two components. The first hedge insures against fluctuations in an optimally designed bond with a maturity date matching the investor's horizon. The second hedge immunizes against fluctuations in the market price of risk in the bond numéraire. Various applications are examined. New results concerning the behavior of extremely risk-averse individuals, the demand for bonds and its long-horizon limit, and the optimal portfolio in incomplete markets are derived.

Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control

Bodnaruk, A., Massa, M., Simonov, A. — 2009-06-08

We study holdings in merger and acquisition (M&A) targets by financial conglomerates in which affiliated investment banks advise the bidders. We show that advisors take positions in the targets before M&A announcements. These stakes are positively related to the probability of observing the bid and to the target premium. We argue that this can be explained in terms of advisors who are privy to important information about the deal, investing in the target in the expectation of its price increasing. We document the high profits of this strategy. The advisory stake is positively related to the likelihood of deal completion and to the termination fees. However, these deals are not wealth creating: there is a negative relation between the advisory stake and the viability of the deal.

Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics

Bebchuk, L. A., Neeman, Z. — 2009-06-03

We model how three groups—insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors, and entrepreneurs planning to take firms public—compete for influence over politicians setting the level of investor protection. We identify factors that push toward suboptimal investor protection, including corporate insiders’ ability to use public firms’ assets to influence politicians, and institutional investors’ inability to capture fully the value of investor protection for outside investors. Entrepreneurs and public firms’ interest in raising equity capital does not fully eliminate the distortions arising from insiders seeking to extract rents from capital in place. Our analysis produces many testable predictions concerning how investor protection varies over time and around the world.

Expected Idiosyncratic Skewness

Boyer, B., Mitton, T., Vorkink, K. — 2009-06-03

We test the prediction of recent theories that stocks with high idiosyncratic skewness should have low expected returns. Because lagged skewness alone does not adequately forecast skewness, we estimate a cross-sectional model of expected skewness that uses additional predictive variables. Consistent with recent theories, we find that expected idiosyncratic skewness and returns are negatively correlated. Specifically, the Fama-French alpha of a low-expected-skewness quintile exceeds the alpha of a high-expected-skewness quintile by 1.00% per month. Furthermore, the coefficients on expected skewness in Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions are negative and significant. In addition, we find that expected skewness helps explain the phenomenon that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility have low expected returns.

Financial Visibility and the Decision to Go Private

Mehran, H., Peristiani, S. — 2009-05-27

A large fraction of the companies that went private between 1990 and 2007 were fairly young public firms, often with the same management team making the crucial restructuring decisions at both the time of the initial public offering (IPO) and the buyout. This article investigates the determinants of the decision to go private over a firm's entire public life cycle. Our evidence reveals that firms with declining growth in analyst coverage, falling institutional ownership, and low stock turnover were more likely to go private and opted to do so sooner. We argue that a primary reason behind the decision of IPO firms to abandon their public listing was a failure to attract a critical mass of financial visibility and investor interest.

Too Many to Fail? Evidence of Regulatory Forbearance When the Banking Sector Is Weak

Brown, C. O., Dinc, I. S. — 2009-05-27

This article studies bank failures in twenty-one emerging market countries in the 1990s. By using a competing risk hazard model for bank survival, we show that a government is less likely to take over or close a failing bank if the banking system is weak. This Too-Many-to-Fail effect is robust to controlling for macroeconomic factors, financial crises, the Too-Big-to-Fail effect, domestic financial development, and concerns due to systemic risk and information spillovers. The article also shows that the Too-Many-to-Fail effect is stronger for larger banks and when there is a large government budget deficit.

Ex-dividend Arbitrage in Option Markets

Hao, J., Kalay, A., Mayhew, S. — 2009-05-21

We examine the behavior of call options surrounding the underlying stock's ex-dividend date. The evidence is inconsistent with the predictions of a rational exercise policy; a significant fraction of the open interest remains unexercised, resulting in a windfall gain to option writers. This triggers a sophisticated trading scheme that enables short-term traders to receive a significant fraction of the gains. The trading scheme inflates reported volume and distorts its traditional relations to liquidity. The dramatic increases in the volume of trade on the last cum-dividend day are facilitated by limitations on transaction costs passed by the various option exchanges.

Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund Industry

Bergstresser, D., Chalmers, J. M. R., Tufano, P. — 2009-05-21

Many investors purchase mutual funds through intermediated channels, paying brokers or financial advisors for fund selection and advice. This article attempts to quantify the benefits that investors enjoy in exchange for the costs of these services. We study broker-sold and direct-sold funds from 1996 to 2004, and fail to find that brokers deliver substantial tangible benefits. Relative to direct-sold funds, broker-sold funds deliver lower risk-adjusted returns, even before subtracting distribution costs. These results hold across fund objectives, with the exception of foreign equity funds. Further, broker-sold funds exhibit no more skill at aggregate-level asset allocation than do funds sold through the direct channel. Our results are consistent with two hypotheses: that brokers deliver substantial intangible benefits that we do not observe and that there are material conflicts of interest between brokers and their clients.

Unspanned Stochastic Volatility and the Pricing of Commodity Derivatives

Trolle, A. B., Schwartz, E. S. — 2009-05-10

Commodity derivatives are becoming an increasingly important part of the global derivatives market. Here we develop a tractable stochastic volatility model for pricing commodity derivatives. The model features unspanned stochastic volatility, quasi-analytical prices of options on futures contracts, and dynamics of the futures curve in terms of a low-dimensional affine state vector. We estimate the model on NYMEX crude oil derivatives using an extensive panel data set of 45,517 futures prices and 233,104 option prices, spanning 4082 business days. We find strong evidence for two predominantly unspanned volatility factors.

Variance Risk-Premium Dynamics: The Role of Jumps

Todorov, V. — 2009-05-06

Using high-frequency stock market data and (synthetic) variance swap rates, this paper identifies and investigates the temporal variation in the market variance risk-premium. The variance risk is manifest in two salient features of financial returns: stochastic volatility and jumps. The pricing of these two components is analyzed in a general semiparametric framework. The key empirical results imply that investors' fears of future jumps are especially sensitive to recent jump activity and that their willingness to pay for protection against jumps increases significantly immediately after the occurrence of jumps. This in turn suggests that time-varying risk aversion, as previously documented in the literature, is primarily driven by large, or extreme, market moves. The dynamics of risk-neutral jump intensity extracted from deep out-of-the-money put options confirms these findings.

The Effect of Bank Mergers on Loan Prices: Evidence from the United States

Erel, I. — 2009-05-05

Bank mergers can increase or decrease loan spreads, depending on whether the increased market power outweighs efficiency gains. Using proprietary loan-level data for U.S. commercial banks, I find that, on average, mergers reduce loan spreads, with the magnitude of the reduction being larger when postmerger cost savings increase. My results suggest that the relation between spreads and the extent of the market overlap between merging banks is nonmonotonic. The market overlap increases cost savings and consequently lowers spreads, but when the overlap is sufficiently large, spreads increase, potentially due to the market-power effect dominating the cost savings. Furthermore, the average reduction in spreads is significant for small businesses.

Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis

Demyanyk, Y., Van Hemert, O. — 2009-05-04

Using loan-level data, we analyze the quality of subprime mortgage loans by adjusting their performance for differences in borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, and macroeconomic conditions. We find that the quality of loans deteriorated for six consecutive years before the crisis and that securitizers were, to some extent, aware of it. We provide evidence that the rise and fall of the subprime mortgage market follows a classic lending boom-bust scenario, in which unsustainable growth leads to the collapse of the market. Problems could have been detected long before the crisis, but they were masked by high house price appreciation between 2003 and 2005.

Understanding Index Option Returns

Broadie, M., Chernov, M., Johannes, M. — 2009-05-04

Previous research concludes that options are mispriced based on the high average returns, CAPM alphas, and Sharpe ratios of various put selling strategies. One criticism of these conclusions is that these benchmarks are ill suited to handle the extreme statistical nature of option returns generated by nonlinear payoffs. We propose an alternative way to evaluate the statistical significance of option returns by comparing historical statistics to those generated by option pricing models. The most puzzling finding in the existing literature, the large returns to writing out-of-the-money puts, is not inconsistent (i.e., is statistically insignificant) relative to the Black-Scholes model or the Heston stochastic volatility model due to the extreme sampling uncertainty associated with put returns. This sampling problem can largely be alleviated by analyzing market-neutral portfolios such as straddles or delta-hedged returns. The returns on these portfolios can be explained by jump risk premiums and estimation risk.

Information Linkages and Correlated Trading

Colla, P., Mele, A. — 2009-05-04

In a market with informationally connected traders, the dynamics of volume, price informativeness, price volatility, and liquidity are severely affected by the information linkages every trader experiences with his peers. We show that in the presence of information linkages among traders, volume and price informativeness increase. Moreover, we find that information linkages improve or damage market depth, and lower or boost the Traders' profits, according to whether these linkages convey positively or negatively correlated signals. Finally, our model predicts patterns of trade correlation consistent with those identified in the empirical literature: trades generated by "neighbor" traders are positively correlated and trades generated by "distant" traders are negatively correlated.

Financial Constraints, Investment, and the Value of Cash Holdings

Denis, D. J., Sibilkov, V. — 2009-05-02

Previous studies report that cash holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. We examine (i) why this is so and (ii) why some constrained firms appear to hold too little cash. Our results indicate that greater cash holdings are associated with higher levels of investment for constrained firms with high hedging needs and that the association between investment and value is stronger for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. These findings imply that higher cash holdings allow constrained firms to undertake value-increasing projects that might otherwise be bypassed. We further find that some constrained firms exhibit low cash holdings because of persistently low cash flows. Overall, our findings support the view that greater cash holdings of constrained firms are a value-increasing response to costly external financing.

Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States

Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J., Metrick, A. — 2009-05-02

We construct a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the United States and use this list to analyze the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. Our data have two useful features. First, since dual-class stock separates cash-flow rights from voting rights, we can separately identify the impact of each. Second, we address endogeneity concerns by using exogenous predictors of dual-class status as instruments. In single-stage regressions, we find strong evidence that firm value is increasing in insiders’ cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights. In instrumental variable regressions, the point estimates are similar but the significance levels are lower.

Empire-Building or Bridge-Building? Evidence from New CEOs' Internal Capital Allocation Decisions

Xuan, Y. — 2009-05-01

This article investigates how the job histories of CEOs influence their capital allocation decisions when they preside over multidivisional firms. I find that, after CEO turnover, divisions not previously affiliated with the new CEO receive significantly more capital expenditures than divisions through which the new CEO has advanced. The pattern of reverse-favoritism in capital allocation is more pronounced if the new CEO has less authority or if the unaffiliated divisions have more bargaining power. I find evidence that having a specialist CEO negatively affects segment investment efficiency. The results suggest that new specialist CEOs use the capital budget as a bridge-building tool to elicit cooperation from powerful divisional managers in previously unaffiliated divisions.

Growth or Glamour? Fundamentals and Systematic Risk in Stock Returns

Campbell, J. Y., Polk, C., Vuolteenaho, T. — 2009-04-22

The cash flows of growth stocks are particularly sensitive to temporary movements in aggregate stock prices, driven by shocks to market discount rates, while the cash flows of value stocks are particularly sensitive to permanent movements, driven by shocks to aggregate cash flows. Thus, the high betas of growth (value) stocks with the market's discount-rate (cash-flow) shocks are determined by the cash-flow fundamentals of growth and value companies. Growth stocks are not merely "glamour stocks" whose systematic risks are purely driven by investor sentiment. More generally, the systematic risks of individual stocks with similar accounting characteristics are primarily driven by the systematic risks of their fundamentals.

Institutional Investors and the Informational Efficiency of Prices

Boehmer, E., Kelley, E. K. — 2009-04-17

Using a broad panel of NYSE-listed stocks between 1983 and 2004, we study the relation between institutional shareholdings and the relative informational efficiency of prices, measured as deviations from a random walk. Stocks with greater institutional ownership are priced more efficiently, and we show that variation in liquidity does not drive this result. One mechanism through which prices become more efficient is institutional trading activity, even when institutions trade passively. But efficiency is also directly related to institutional holdings, even after controlling for institutional trading, analyst coverage, short selling, variation in liquidity, and firm characteristics.

What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their Trading

Ravina, E., Sapienza, P. — 2009-04-13

We compare the trading performance of independent directors and other executives. The findings reveal that independent directors earn positive substantial abnormal returns when they purchase their company stock, and that the difference from the same firm's executives is relatively small at most horizons. We also find that executives and independent directors make higher returns in firms with the weakest governance, the gap between these two widens in such firms, and that independent directors sitting on the audit committee earn higher returns than other independent directors at the same firm. Independent directors also earn significantly abnormal returns when they sell the company stock in a window before bad news and around earnings restatements.

Benchmarking Money Manager Performance: Issues and Evidence

Chan, L. K. C., Dimmock, S. G., Lakonishok, J. — 2009-04-13

Academic and practitioner research evaluates portfolio performance using size and value/growth attributes or factors. We assess the merits of popular evaluation procedures based on matched-characteristic benchmark portfolios or time-series return regressions by applying them to a sample of active money managers and passive indexes. Estimated abnormal returns display large variation across approaches. The benchmarks typically used in academic research—attribute-matched portfolios from independent sorts, the three-factor time-series model, and cross-sectional regressions of returns on stock characteristics—track returns poorly. Some simple alterations improve the performance of these methods.

Nonparametric Estimation of State-Price Densities Implicit in Interest Rate Cap Prices

Li, H., Zhao, F. — 2009-04-10

Based on a multivariate extension of the constrained locally polynomial estimator of Aït-Sahalia and Duarte (2003), we provide one of the first nonparametric estimates of probability densities of LIBOR rates under forward martingale measures and state-price densities (SPDs) implicit in interest rate cap prices. The forward densities and SPDs depend significantly on the slope and volatility of LIBOR rates, and mortgage markets activities have strong impacts on the shape of the forward densities. The SPDs exhibit a pronounced U-shape as a function of future LIBOR rates, suggesting that the state prices are high at both extremely low and high interest rates, which tend to be associated with recessions and periods of high inflation, respectively. Our results provide nonparametric evidence of unspanned stochastic volatility and suggest that the unspanned factors could be partly driven by activities in the mortgage markets.

Bankruptcy Codes and Innovation

Acharya, V. V., Subramanian, K. V. — 2009-04-09

We argue that when bankruptcy code is creditor friendly, excessive liquidations cause levered firms to shun innovation, whereas by promoting continuation upon failure, a debtor-friendly code induces greater innovation. We provide empirical support for this claim by employing patents as a proxy for innovation. Using time-series changes within a country and cross-country variation in creditor rights, we confirm that a creditor-friendly code leads to a lower absolute level of innovation by firms, as well as relatively lower innovation by firms in technologically innovative industries. When creditor rights are stronger, technologically innovative industries employ relatively less leverage and grow disproportionately slower.

The Effects of Marital Status and Children on Savings and Portfolio Choice

Love, D. A. — 2009-04-07

This paper investigates the impact of demographic shocks on optimal decisions about saving, life insurance, and, most centrally, asset allocation. The analysis indicates that marital-status transitions can have important effects on optimal household decisions, particularly in the cases of widowhood and divorce. Children also play a fundamental role in portfolio choice; in addition to leading to substantially different average allocations, they also have strong interaction effects with changes in marital status. Panel data evidence on stockholding suggests that changes in marital status and children matter empirically as well, but not always in the manner that the model predicts.

A Reexamination of Corporate Governance and Equity Prices

Johnson, S. A., Moorman, T. C., Sorescu, S. — 2009-04-06

We reexamine long-term abnormal returns for portfolios sorted on governance characteristics. Firms with strong shareholder rights and firms with weak shareholder rights differ from the population of firms and from each other in how they cluster across industries. Using well-specified tests under this industry clustering, we find statistically zero long-term abnormal returns for portfolios sorted on governance. Our results have important implications for interpreting studies that link governance to firm value and stock returns, demonstrate the importance of the coarseness of industry definitions in financial research, and shed light on addressing statistical problems created by industry clustering in samples.

Anomalies

Li, E. X. N., Livdan, D., Zhang, L. — 2009-04-02

We take a simple q-theory model and ask how well it can explain external financing anomalies, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Our central insight is that optimal investment is an important driving force of these anomalies. The model simultaneously reproduces procyclical equity issuance waves, the negative relation between investment and average returns, long-term underperformance following equity issues, positive long-term drift following cash distributions, the mean-reverting operating performance of issuing and cash-distributing firms, and the failure of the CAPM in explaining the long-term stock-price drifts. However, the model cannot fully capture the magnitude of the positive drift following cash distributions observed in the data.

Return Decomposition

Chen, L., Zhao, X. — 2009-04-02

A crucial issue in asset pricing is to understand the relative importance of discount rate (DR) news and cash flow (CF) news in driving the time-series and cross-sectional variations of stock returns. Many studies directly estimate the DR news but back out the CF news as the residual. We argue that this approach has a serious limitation because the DR news cannot be accurately measured due to the small predictive power, and the CF news, as the residual, inherits the large misspecification error of the DR news. We apply this residual-based decomposition approach to Treasury bonds and equities and find results that are either counterintuitive or unrobust. Potential solutions, including modeling both DR news and CF news directly, the Bayesian model averaging approach, and the principal component analysis, are explored.

A Dynamic Model of the Limit Order Book

Rosu, I. — 2009-04-02

This paper presents a model of an order-driven market where fully strategic, symmetrically informed liquidity traders dynamically choose between limit and market orders, trading off execution price and waiting costs. In equilibrium, the bid and ask prices depend only on the numbers of buy and sell orders in the book. The model has a number of empirical predictions: (i) higher trading activity and higher trading competition cause smaller spreads and lower price impact; (ii) market orders lead to a temporary price impact larger than the permanent price impact, therefore to price overshooting; (iii) buy and sell orders can cluster away from the bid-ask spread, generating a hump-shaped order book; (iv) bid and ask prices display a comovement effect: after, e.g., a sell market order moves the bid price down, the ask price also falls, by a smaller amount, so the bid-ask spread widens; (v) when the order book is full, traders may submit quick, or fleeting, limit orders.

Price Drift as an Outcome of Differences in Higher-Order Beliefs

Banerjee, S., Kaniel, R., Kremer, I. — 2009-04-01

Motivated by the insight of Keynes (1936) on the importance of higher-order beliefs in financial markets, we examine the role of such beliefs in generating drift in asset prices. We show that in a dynamic setting, a higher-order difference of opinions is necessary for heterogeneous beliefs to generate price drift. Such drift does not arise in standard difference of opinion models, since investors' beliefs are assumed to be common knowledge. Our results stand in contrast to those of Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) and others, as we argue that in rational expectation equilibria, heterogeneous beliefs do not lead to price drift.

Size and Focus of a Venture Capitalist's Portfolio

Fulghieri, P., Sevilir, M. — 2009-03-27

We take a portfolio approach to analyze the investment strategy of a venture capitalist (VC) and show that portfolio size and scope affect both the entrepreneurs' and the VC's incentives to exert effort. A small portfolio improves entrepreneurial incentives because it allows the VC to concentrate the limited human capital on a smaller number of startups, adding more value. A large and focused portfolio is beneficial because it allows the VC to reallocate the limited resources and human capital in the case of startup failure and allows the VC to extract greater rents from the entrepreneurs. We show that the VC finds it optimal to limit portfolio size when startups have higher payoff potential—that is, when providing strong entrepreneurial incentives is most valuable. The VC expands portfolio size only when startup fundamentals are more moderate and when he can form a sufficiently focused portfolio. Finally, we show that the VC may find it optimal to engage in portfolio management by divesting some of the startups early since this strategy allows him to extract a greater surplus.

Return Reversals, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Expected Returns

Huang, W., Liu, Q., Rhee, S. G., Zhang, L. — 2009-03-25

The empirical evidence on the cross-sectional relation between idiosyncratic risk and expected stock returns is mixed. We demonstrate that the omission of the previous month's stock returns can lead to a negatively biased estimate of the relation. The magnitude of the omitted variable bias depends on the approach to estimating the conditional idiosyncratic volatility. Although a negative relation exists when the estimate is based on daily returns, it disappears after return reversals are controlled for. Return reversals can explain both the negative relation between value-weighted portfolio returns and idiosyncratic volatility and the insignificant relation between equal-weighted portfolio returns and idiosyncratic volatility. In contrast, there is a significantly positive relation between the conditional idiosyncratic volatility estimated from monthly data and expected returns. This relation remains robust after controlling for return reversals.

Incentive Contracts in Delegated Portfolio Management

Li, C. W., Tiwari, A. — 2009-03-25

This article analyzes optimal nonlinear portfolio management contracts. We consider a setting in which the investor faces moral hazard with respect to the effort and risk choices of the portfolio manager. The employment contract promises the manager: (i) a fixed payment, (ii) a proportional asset-based fee, (iii) a benchmark-linked fulcrum fee, and (iv) a benchmark-linked option-type "bonus" incentive fee. We show that the option-type incentive helps overcome the effort-underinvestment problem that undermines linear contracts. More generally, we find that for the set of contracts we consider, with the appropriate choice of benchmark it is always optimal to include a bonus incentive fee in the contract. We derive the conditions that such a benchmark must satisfy. Our results suggest that current regulatory restrictions on asymmetric performance-based fees in mutual fund advisory contracts may be costly.

Explaining Credit Default Swap Spreads with the Equity Volatility and Jump Risks of Individual Firms

Zhang, B. Y., Zhou, H., Zhu, H. — 2009-03-19

This paper attempts to explain the credit default swap (CDS) premium, using a novel approach to identify the volatility and jump risks of individual firms from high-frequency equity prices. Our empirical results suggest that the volatility risk alone predicts 48% of the variation in CDS spread levels, whereas the jump risk alone forecasts 19%. After controlling for credit ratings, macroeconomic conditions, and firms' balance sheet information, we can explain 73% of the total variation. We calibrate a Merton-type structural model with stochastic volatility and jumps, which can help to match credit spreads after controlling for the historical default rates. Simulation evidence suggests that the high-frequency-based volatility measures can help to explain the credit spreads, above and beyond what is already captured by the true leverage ratio.

Tunnel-Proofing the Executive Suite: Transparency, Temptation, and the Design of Executive Compensation

Noe, T. H. — 2009-03-04

This paper considers optimal compensation for a CEO who is entrusted with administering corporate assets honestly. Optimal compensation designs maximize integrity at minimum cost. These designs are very "low powered," i.e., while specifying a lower bound for performance and increasing pay with performance, they increase compensation at a rapidly decreasing rate. Thus, integrity considerations engender optimal compensation packages that closely resemble the very pervasive 80/120 bonus plans, exactly the sort of compensation that Jensen (2003) argues should compromise integrity. Under optimal designs, expected compensation increases linearly with firm size, and increases in the market/book ratio. Moreover, given optimal compensation, CEO asset diversion is limited to high market-to-book firms that have received negative productivity shocks.

Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?

Kaplan, S. N., Rauh, J. — 2009-03-03

We study how much of the top end of the income distribution is represented by four sectors—non-financial-firm top executives (Main Street); investment bankers and hedge, private equity, and mutual fund investors (Wall Street); corporate lawyers; and athletes and celebrities. Wall Street individuals comprise a higher percentage of the top income brackets than nonfinancial executives of public companies. While top executives’ representation in the top brackets has increased from 1994 to 2004, Wall Street's representation has likely increased even more. We discuss the implications of our findings for different explanations for the increased skewness at the highest income levels.

Simulation-Based Estimation of Contingent-Claims Prices

Phillips, P. C. B., Yu, J. — 2009-03-02

A new methodology is proposed to estimate theoretical prices of financial contingent claims whose values are dependent on some other underlying financial assets. In the literature, the preferred choice of estimator is usually maximum likelihood (ML). ML has strong asymptotic justification but is not necessarily the best method in finite samples. This paper proposes a simulation-based method. When it is used in connection with ML, it can improve the finite-sample performance of the ML estimator while maintaining its good asymptotic properties. The method is implemented and evaluated here in the Black-Scholes option pricing model and in the Vasicek bond and bond option pricing model. It is especially favored when the bias in ML is large due to strong persistence in the data or strong nonlinearity in pricing functions. Monte Carlo studies show that the proposed procedures achieve bias reductions over ML estimation in pricing contingent claims when ML is biased. The bias reductions are sometimes accompanied by reductions in variance. Empirical applications to U.S. Treasury bills highlight the differences between the bond prices implied by the simulation-based approach and those delivered by ML. Some consequences for the statistical testing of contingent-claim pricing models are discussed.

Theory-Based Illiquidity and Asset Pricing

Chordia, T., Huh, S.-W., Subrahmanyam, A. — 2009-02-26

Many proxies of illiquidity have been used in the literature that relates illiquidity to asset prices. These proxies have been motivated from an empirical standpoint. In this study, we approach liquidity estimation from a theoretical perspective. Our method explicitly recognizes the analytic dependence of illiquidity on more primitive drivers such as trading activity and information asymmetry. More specifically, we estimate illiquidity using structural formulae in line with Kyle's (1985) lambda for a comprehensive sample of stocks. The empirical results provide evidence that theory-based estimates of illiquidity are priced in the cross-section of expected stock returns, even after accounting for risk factors, firm characteristics known to influence returns, and other illiquidity proxies prevalent in the literature.

Demand-Based Option Pricing

Garleanu, N., Pedersen, L. H., Poteshman, A. M. — 2009-02-25

We model demand-pressure effects on option prices. The model shows that demand pressure in one option contract increases its price by an amount proportional to the variance of the unhedgeable part of the option. Similarly, the demand pressure increases the price of any other option by an amount proportional to the covariance of the unhedgeable parts of the two options. Empirically, we identify aggregate positions of dealers and end-users using a unique dataset, and show that demand-pressure effects make a contribution to well-known option-pricing puzzles. Indeed, time-series tests show that demand helps explain the overall expensiveness and skew patterns of index options, and cross-sectional tests show that demand impacts the expensiveness of single-stock options as well.

On the Growth Effect of Stock Market Liberalizations

Gupta, N., Yuan, K. — 2009-02-20

We investigate the effect of a stock market liberalization on industry growth in emerging markets. Consistent with the view that liberalization reduces financing constraints, we find that industries that are more externally dependent and face better growth opportunities grew faster following liberalization. However, this growth increase appears to come from an expansion in the size of existing firms rather than through the entry of financially constrained new firms. We show that following liberalization, new firm growth occurs in countries and industries with lower entry barriers. Hence, liberalization has a more uniform growth impact if accompanied by competition-enhancing reforms.

Parametric Portfolio Policies: Exploiting Characteristics in the Cross-Section of Equity Returns

Brandt, M. W., Santa-Clara, P., Valkanov, R. — 2009-02-13

We propose a novel approach to optimizing portfolios with large numbers of assets. We model directly the portfolio weight in each asset as a function of the asset's characteristics. The coefficients of this function are found by optimizing the investor's average utility of the portfolio's return over the sample period. Our approach is computationally simple and easily modified and extended to capture the effect of transaction costs, for example, produces sensible portfolio weights, and offers robust performance in and out of sample. In contrast, the traditional approach of first modeling the joint distribution of returns and then solving for the corresponding optimal portfolio weights is not only difficult to implement for a large number of assets but also yields notoriously noisy and unstable results. We present an empirical implementation for the universe of all stocks in the CRSP–Compustat data set, exploiting the size, value, and momentum anomalies.

Expected Stock Returns and Variance Risk Premia

Bollerslev, T., Tauchen, G., Zhou, H. — 2009-02-12

Motivated by the implications from a stylized self-contained general equilibrium model incorporating the effects of time-varying economic uncertainty, we show that the difference between implied and realized variation, or the variance risk premium, is able to explain a nontrivial fraction of the time-series variation in post-1990 aggregate stock market returns, with high (low) premia predicting high (low) future returns. Our empirical results depend crucially on the use of "model-free," as opposed to Black–Scholes, options implied volatilities, along with accurate realized variation measures constructed from high-frequency intraday as opposed to daily data. The magnitude of the predictability is particularly strong at the intermediate quarterly return horizon, where it dominates that afforded by other popular predictor variables, such as the P/E ratio, the default spread, and the consumption–wealth ratio.

The Geography of Hedge Funds

Teo, M. — 2009-02-10

This article analyzes the relationship between the risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds and their proximity to investments using data on Asia-focused hedge funds. I find, relative to an augmented Fung and Hsieh (2004) factor model, that hedge funds with a physical presence (head or research office) in their investment region outperform other hedge funds by 3.72% per year. The local information advantage is pervasive across all major geographical regions, but is strongest for emerging market funds and funds holding illiquid securities. These results are robust to adjustments for fund fees, serial correlation, backfill bias, and incubation bias. I show also that distant funds, especially those based in the United States and the United Kingdom, are able to raise more capital, charge higher fees, and set longer redemption periods, despite their underperformance relative to nearby funds. It appears that distant funds trade investment performance for better access to capital.

Option Backdating and Board Interlocks

Bizjak, J., Lemmon, M., Whitby, R. — 2009-02-06

We examine the role of board connections in explaining how the controversial practice of backdating employee stock options spread to a large number of firms across a wide range of industries. The increase in the likelihood that a firm begins to backdate stock options that can be explained by having a board member who is interlocked to a previously identified backdating firm is approximately one-third of the unconditional probability of backdating in our sample. Our analysis provides new insight into how boards function and the role that they play in providing managerial oversight and determining corporate strategy.

The Sale of Multiple Assets with Private Information

He, Z. — 2009-01-27

By generalizing the Leland and Pyle (1977) model to the case of multiple correlated assets, this paper studies the signaling and hedging behavior of an intermediary who sells multiple assets in financial markets. Based on information asymmetry, this paper demonstrates the intrinsic interdependence of risk management and asset selling for intermediaries, and obtains several testable empirical implications. For instance, an intermediary with a more diversified underlying portfolio will face greater liquidity (a smaller price impact) when selling assets to the market. Several applications are discussed, including bank loan sales and selling mechanisms.

Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-management Appointments

Ljungqvist, A., Marston, F., Wilhelm, W. J. — 2009-01-22

We show that relatively optimistic research and even the mere provision of research coverage for the issuer (regardless of its direction) attract co-management appointments for securities offerings. Co-management appointments are valuable because they help banks establish relationships with issuers. These relationships, in turn, substantially increase the banks’ chances of winning more lucrative lead-management mandates in the future. This is true even in the presence of historically exclusive banking relationships.

Disagreement and Learning in a Dynamic Contracting Model

Adrian, T., Westerfield, M. M. — 2009-01-12

We present a dynamic contracting model in which the principal and agent disagree about the resolution of uncertainty, and we illustrate the contract design in an application with Bayesian learning. The disagreement creates gains from trade that the principal realizes by transferring payment to states that the agent considers relatively more likely, changing incentives. The interaction between incentive provision and learning creates an intertemporal source of "disagreement risk" that alters optimal risk sharing. There is an endogenous regime shift between economies with small and large belief differences, and an early shock to beliefs can lead to large persistent differences in variable pay even after beliefs have converged. Under risk-neutrality, "selling the firm" to the agent does not implement the first-best because it precludes state-contingent trades.

Conflicts of Interest and Stock Recommendations: The Effects of the Global Settlement and Related Regulations

Kadan, O., Madureira, L., Wang, R., Zach, T. — 2009-01-12

We study the effect of the Global Analyst Research Settlement and related regulations on sell-side research. These regulations attempted to mitigate the interdependence between research and investment banking. We document that following the regulations many brokerage houses have migrated from the traditional five-tier rating system to a three-tier system. Optimistic recommendations have become less frequent and more informative, whereas neutral and pessimistic recommendations have become more frequent and less informative. Importantly, the overall informativeness of recommendations has declined. The likelihood of issuing optimistic recommendations no longer depends on affiliation with the covered firm, although affiliated analysts are still reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations.

Estimating the Effect of Hierarchies on Information Use

Liberti, J. M., Mian, A. R. — 2009-01-09

Theory suggests that greater hierarchical distance between a subordinate and his boss makes it more difficult to share abstract and subjective information in decision making. A novel dataset put together from credit dossiers of large corporate loan applicants enables us to observe the information collected by loan officers, and how it is used by the ultimate loan approving officer. We find that greater hierarchical/geographical distance between the information collecting agent and the loan approving officer leads to less reliance on subjective information and more on objective information. By exploiting nonlinearities in the "assignment rules" that determine an applicant's hierarchical distance, and using information collecting agent fixed effects, we show that our result cannot be driven by endogenous assignment of applicants. We also find that higher frequency of interactions between the information collecting agent and loan approving officer, both over time and through geographical proximity, helps mitigate the effects of hierarchical distance on information use. Our results show that hierarchical distance influences information use, and highlights the importance of "human touch" in communication.

The Effectiveness of Reputation as a Disciplinary Mechanism in Sell-Side Research

Fang, L., Yasuda, A. — 2009-01-08

We examine whether the quality differentials in earnings forecasts between reputable and nonreputable analysts vary with the severity of conflicts of interest. We measure personal reputation using the Institutional Investor All-American (AA) awards, and bank reputation using Carter-Manaster ranks. While both personal and bank reputation are associated with higher quality forecasts overall, their effectiveness against conflicts of interest differs. The severity of conflicts has a negative and significant effect on the performance of non-AAs at top-tier banks relative to other analysts, while it has a positive and significant effect on the performance of AAs at top-tier banks relative to others. Thus personal reputation is an effective disciplinary device against conflicts of interest, while bank reputation alone is not.

Bank Liquidity Creation

Berger, A. N., Bouwman, C. H. S. — 2009-01-08

Although the modern theory of financial intermediation portrays liquidity creation as an essential role of banks, comprehensive measures of bank liquidity creation do not exist. We construct four measures and apply them to data on virtually all U.S. banks from 1993 to 2003. We find that bank liquidity creation increased every year and exceeded $2.8 trillion in 2003. Large banks, multibank holding company members, retail banks, and recently merged banks created the most liquidity. Bank liquidity creation is positively correlated with bank value. Testing recent theories of the relationship between capital and liquidity creation, we find that the relationship is positive for large banks and negative for small banks.

Differences in Governance Practices between U.S. and Foreign Firms: Measurement, Causes, and Consequences

Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Stulz, R., Williamson, R. — 2009-01-07

We construct a firm-level governance index that increases with minority shareholder protection. Compared with U.S. matching firms, only 12.68% of foreign firms have a higher index. The value of foreign firms falls as their index decreases relative to the index of matching U.S. firms. Our results suggest that lower country-level investor protection and other country characteristics make it suboptimal for foreign firms to invest as much in governance as U.S. firms do. Overall, we find that minority shareholders benefit from governance improvements and do so partly at the expense of controlling shareholders.

A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium

Edmans, A., Gabaix, X., Landier, A. — 2008-12-24

This paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium, by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model. By considering multiplicative specifications for the CEO's utility and production functions, we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models. First, both the CEO's low fractional ownership (the Jensen–Murphy incentives measure) and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting, and thus need not reflect rent extraction. Second, the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value, divided by annual pay, is independent of firm size, and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives. Third, incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value, such as strategy choice. However, additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring.

The Euro and Corporate Valuations

Bris, A., Koskinen, Y., Nilsson, M. — 2008-12-24

In this paper, we study the changes in corporate valuations induced by the adoption of the euro as the common currency in Europe. We use corporate-level data from seventeen European countries, of which eleven adopted the euro. We show that the introduction of the euro has increased Tobin's Q-ratios by 17.1% in the {euro-area} countries that previously had weak currencies. Part of the increase in corporate valuations is explained by the decrease in interest rates and by the decrease in the cost of equity. The increases in Tobin's Q are larger for firms that would be harmed by currency devaluations.

Do Shareholder Rights Affect the Cost of Bank Loans?

Chava, S., Livdan, D., Purnanandam, A. — 2008-12-23

Using a large sample of bank loans issued to U.S. firms between 1990 and 2004, we find that lower takeover defenses (as proxied by the lower G-index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003) significantly increase the cost of loans for a firm. Firms with lowest takeover defense (democracy) pay a 25% higher spread on their bank loans as compared with firms with the highest takeover defense (dictatorship), after controlling for various firm and loan characteristics. Further investigations indicate that banks charge a higher loan spread to firms with higher takeover vulnerability mainly because of their concern about a substantial increase in financial risk after the takeover. Our results have important implications for understanding the link between a firm's governance structure and its cost of capital. Our study suggests that firms that rely too much on corporate control market as a governance device are punished by costlier bank loans.

Ownership: Evolution and Regulation

Franks, J., Mayer, C., Rossi, S. — 2008-12-23

This article is the first study of long-run evolution of investor protection and corporate ownership in the United Kingdom over the twentieth century. Formal investor protection emerged only in the second half of the century. We assess the influence of investor protection on ownership by comparing cross-sections of firms at different times in the century and the evolution of firms incorporating at different stages of the century. Investor protection had little impact on dispersion of ownership: even in the absence of investor protection, rates of dispersion of ownership were high, associated primarily with mergers. Preliminary evidence suggests that ownership dispersion in the United Kingdom relied more on informal relations of trust than on formal investor protection.

The Limitations of Industry Concentration Measures Constructed with Compustat Data: Implications for Finance Research

Ali, A., Klasa, S., Yeung, E. — 2008-12-23

Industry concentration measures calculated with Compustat data, which cover only the public firms in an industry, are poor proxies for actual industry concentration. These measures have correlations of only 13% with the corresponding U.S. Census measures, which are based on all public and private firms in an industry. Also, only when U.S. Census measures are used is there evidence consistent with theoretical predictions that more-concentrated industries, which should be more oligopolistic, are populated by larger and fewer firms with higher price-cost margins. Further, the significant relations of Compustat-based industry concentration measures with the dependent variables of several important prior studies are not obtained when U.S. Census measures are used. One of the reasons for this occurrence is that Compustat-based measures proxy for industry decline. Overall, our results indicate that product markets research that uses Compustat-based industry concentration measures may lead to incorrect conclusions.

Measuring Abnormal Bond Performance

Bessembinder, H., Kahle, K. M., Maxwell, W. F., Xu, D. — 2008-12-11

We analyze the empirical power and specification of test statistics designed to detect abnormal bond returns in corporate event studies, using monthly and daily data. We find that test statistics based on frequently used methods of calculating abnormal monthly bond returns are biased. Most methods implemented in monthly data also lack power to detect abnormal returns. We also consider unique issues arising when using the newly available daily bond data, and formulate and test methods to calculate daily abnormal bond returns. Using daily bond data significantly increases the power of the tests, relative to the monthly data. Weighting individual trades by size while eliminating noninstitutional trades from the TRACE data also increases the power of the tests to detect abnormal performance, relative to using all trades or the last price of the day. Further, value-weighted portfolio-matching approaches are better specified and more powerful than equal-weighted approaches. Finally, we examine abnormal bond returns to acquirers around mergers and acquisitions to demonstrate how the abnormal return model and use of daily versus monthly data can affect inferences.

Good Times or Bad Times? Investors' Uncertainty and Stock Returns

Ozoguz, A. — 2008-12-11

This paper investigates empirically the dynamics of investors' beliefs and Bayesian uncertainty about the state of the economy as state variables that describe the time-variation in investment opportunities. Using measures of uncertainty constructed from the state probabilities estimated from two-state regime-switching models of aggregate market return and of aggregate output, I find a negative relationship between the level of uncertainty and asset valuations. This relationship shows substantial cross-sectional variation across portfolios sorted on size, book-to-market, and past returns, especially conditional on the state of the economy. I show that a conditional model with investors' beliefs and an uncertainty risk factor is remarkably successful in explaining a large part of the cross-sectional variation in average portfolio returns. The uncertainty risk factor retains its incremental explanatory power when compared to other conditional models such as the conditional CAPM.

Liquidity and Manipulation of Executive Compensation Schemes

Axelson, U., Baliga, S. — 2008-11-26

Compensation contracts have been criticized for encouraging managers to manipulate information. This includes bonus schemes that encourage earnings smoothing, and option packages that allow managers to cash out early when the firm is overvalued. We show that the intransparency induced by these contract features is critical for giving long-term incentives. Lack of transparency makes it harder for the owner to engage in ex post optimal but ex ante inefficient liquidity provision to the manager. For the same reason, it is often optimal to "pay for luck" (i.e., tie long-term compensation to variables that the manager has no influence over, but may have private information about, such as future profitability of the whole industry).

What You Sell Is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts

Giannetti, M., Burkart, M., Ellingsen, T. — 2008-11-24

We relate trade credit to product characteristics and aspects of bank–firm relationships and document three main empirical regularities. First, the use of trade credit is associated with the nature of the transacted good. In particular, suppliers of differentiated products and services have larger accounts receivable than suppliers of standardized goods and firms buying more services receive cheaper trade credit for longer periods. Second, firms receiving trade credit secure financing from relatively uninformed banks. Third, a majority of the firms in our sample appear to receive trade credit at low cost. Additionally, firms that are more creditworthy and have some buyer market power receive larger early payment discounts.

Ambiguity Aversion and the Term Structure of Interest Rates

Gagliardini, P., Porchia, P., Trojani, F. — 2008-11-24

This paper studies the term structure implications of a simple structural model in which the representative agent displays ambiguity aversion, modeled by Multiple Priors Recursive Utility. Bond excess returns reflect a premium for ambiguity, which is observationally distinct from the risk premium of affine yield curve models. The ambiguity premium can be large even in the simplest log-utility setting and is also nonzero for stochastic factors that have a zero risk premium. A calibrated low-dimensional two-factor model with ambiguity is able to reproduce the deviations from the expectations hypothesis documented in the literature, without modifying in a substantial way the nonlinear mean-reversion dynamics of the short interest rate. Moreover, the model does not imply any apparent trade-off between fitting the first and second moments of the yield curve.

An Economic Evaluation of Empirical Exchange Rate Models

Della Corte, P., Sarno, L., Tsiakas, I. — 2008-11-06

This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of the short-horizon predictive ability of economic fundamentals and forward premiums on monthly exchange-rate returns in a framework that allows for volatility timing. We implement Bayesian methods for estimation and ranking of a set of empirical exchange rate models, and construct combined forecasts based on Bayesian model averaging. More importantly, we assess the economic value of the in-sample and out-of-sample forecasting power of the empirical models, and find two key results: (1) a risk-averse investor will pay a high performance fee to switch from a dynamic portfolio strategy based on the random walk model to one that conditions on the forward premium with stochastic volatility innovations and (2) strategies based on combined forecasts yield large economic gains over the random walk benchmark. These two results are robust to reasonably high transaction costs.

Model Comparison Using the Hansen-Jagannathan Distance

Kan, R., Robotti, C. — 2008-11-01

Although it is of interest to test whether or not a particular asset pricing model is literally true, a more useful task for empirical researchers is to determine how wrong a model is and to compare the performance of competing asset pricing models. In this paper, we propose a new methodology to test whether or not two competing linear asset pricing models have the same Hansen-Jagannathan distance. We show that the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic depends on whether the competing models are correctly specified or misspecified, and on whether the competing models are nested or non-nested. In addition, given the increasing interest in misspecified models, we propose a simple methodology for computing the standard errors of the estimated stochastic discount factor parameters that are robust to model misspecification. Using monthly data on 25 size and book-to-market ranked portfolios and the one-month T-bill, we show that the commonly used returns and factors are, for the most part, too noisy for us to conclude that one model is superior to the other models in terms of Hansen-Jagannathan distance. Specifically, there is little evidence that conditional and intertemporal capital asset pricing model (CAPM)-type specifications outperform the simple unconditional CAPM. In addition, we show that many of the macroeconomic factors commonly used in the literature are no longer priced once potential model misspecification is taken into account.

Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies

Cronqvist, H., Fahlenbrach, R. — 2008-10-29

We analyze the effects of heterogeneity across large shareholders, using a new blockholder-firm panel dataset in which we can track all unique blockholders among large public firms in the United States. We find statistically significant and economically important blockholder fixed effects in investment, financial, and executive compensation policies. We also find blockholder fixed effects in firm performance measures, and differences in corporate policies are systematically related to differences in firm performance. We study potential sources of the heterogeneity and find that blockholders with a larger block size, board membership, direct management involvement, or with a single decision maker are associated with larger effects on corporate policies and firm performance.

Pension Reform, Ownership Structure, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Giannetti, M., Laeven, L. — 2008-10-08

Sweden offers a unique natural experiment to analyze the effects of institutionalized saving on the ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm performance. The Swedish pension reform increased the stock market participation of pension funds, causing a significant reshuffling in the ownership of pension funds. We show that the effects of institutional investment on firm performance depend on the industry structure of pension funds. Firm valuation improves if public pension funds and large independent private pension funds increase their shareholdings. Additionally, controlling shareholders appear reluctant to relinquish control and the control premium increases if public pension funds acquire shares.

Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms?

Leuz, C., Lins, K. V., Warnock, F. E. — 2008-10-08

As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is important to understand factors that influence whether foreign investors provide capital to a country's firms. We study 4,409 firms from twenty-nine countries to assess whether and why concerns about corporate governance result in fewer foreign holdings. We find that foreigners invest less in firms that reside in countries with poor outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership structures that are conducive to governance problems. This effect is particularly pronounced when earnings are opaque, indicating that information asymmetry and monitoring costs faced by foreign investors likely drive the results.

Does Asymmetric Information Drive Capital Structure Decisions?

Bharath, S. T., Pasquariello, P., Wu, G. — 2008-09-09

Using a novel information asymmetry index based on measures of adverse selection developed by the market microstructure literature, we test whether information asymmetry is an important determinant of capital structure decisions, as suggested by the pecking order theory. Our index relies exclusively on measures of the market's assessment of adverse selection risk rather than on ex ante firm characteristics. We find that information asymmetry does affect the capital structure decisions of U.S. firms over the sample period 1973–2002. Our findings are robust to controlling for conventional leverage factors (size, tangibility, Q ratio, profitability), the sources of firms' financing needs, and such firm attributes as stock return volatility, stock turnover, and intensity of insider trading. For example, we estimate that on average, for every dollar of financing deficit to cover, firms in the highest adverse selection decile issue 30 cents of debt more than firms in the lowest decile. Overall, this evidence explains why the pecking order theory is only partially successful in explaining all of firms' capital structure decisions. It also suggests that the theory finds support when its basic assumptions hold in the data, as should reasonably be expected of any theory.

Government Control of Privatized Firms

Bortolotti, B., Faccio, M. — 2008-08-31

We study the change in government control of privatized firms in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. At the end of 2000, after the largest privatization wave in history, governments retained control of 62.4% of privatized firms. In civil law countries, governments tend to retain large ownership positions, whereas in common law countries they typically use golden shares. When we combine these two mechanisms, we find no association between a country's legal tradition and the extent of government control. Rather, we document more prevalent government influence over privatized firms in countries with proportional electoral rules and with a centralized system of political authority.

Entrepreneurial Learning, the IPO Decision, and the Post-IPO Drop in Firm Profitability

Pastor, L., Taylor, L. A., Veronesi, P. — 2008-08-29

We develop a model of the optimal initial public offering (IPO) decision in the presence of learning about the average profitability of a private firm. The entrepreneur trades off diversification benefits of going public against benefits of private control. Going public is optimal when the firm's expected future profitability is sufficiently high. The model predicts that firm profitability should decline after the IPO, on average, and that this decline should be larger for firms with more volatile profitability and firms with less uncertain average profitability. These predictions are supported empirically in a sample of 7183 IPOs in the United States between 1975 and 2004.

The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors

Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., Yang, T. — 2008-08-28

Using eight thousand public companies, we study the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and other contemporary reforms on directors and boards, guided by their impact on the supply and demand for directors. SOX increased directors' workload and risk (reducing the supply), and increased demand by mandating that firms have more outside directors. We find both broad-based changes and cross-sectional changes (by firm size). Board committees meet more often post-SOX and Director and Officer (D&O) insurance premiums have doubled. Directors post-SOX are more likely to be lawyers/consultants, financial experts, and retired executives, and less likely to be current executives. Post-SOX boards are larger and more independent. Finally, we find significant increases in director pay and overall director costs, particularly among smaller firms.

How Are U.S. Family Firms Controlled?

Villalonga, B., Amit, R. — 2008-08-26

In large U.S. corporations, founding families are the only blockholders whose control rights on average exceed their cash-flow rights. We analyze how they achieve this wedge, and at what cost. Indirect ownership through trusts, foundations, limited partnerships, and other corporations is prevalent but rarely creates a wedge (a pyramid). The primary sources of the wedge are dual-class stock, disproportionate board representation, and voting agreements. Each control-enhancing mechanism has a different impact on value. Our findings suggest that the potential agency conflict between large shareholders and public shareholders in the United States is as relevant as elsewhere in the world.

On the Relation Between the Credit Spread Puzzle and the Equity Premium Puzzle

Chen, L., Collin-Dufresne, P., Goldstein, R. S. — 2008-08-26

Structural models of default calibrated to historical default rates, recovery rates, and Sharpe ratios typically generate Baa–Aaa credit spreads that are significantly below historical values. However, this "credit spread puzzle" can be resolved if one accounts for the fact that default rates and Sharpe ratios strongly covary; both are high during recessions and low during booms. As a specific example, we investigate credit spread implications of the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) pricing kernel calibrated to equity returns and aggregate consumption data. Identifying the historical surplus consumption ratio from aggregate consumption data, we find that the implied level and time variation of spreads match historical levels well.

Information in Equity Markets with Ambiguity-Averse Investors

Caskey, J. A. — 2008-06-27

This paper shows that persistent mispricing is consistent with a market that includes ambiguity-averse investors. In particular, ambiguity-averse investors may prefer to trade based on aggregate signals that reduce ambiguity at the cost of a loss in information. Equilibrium prices may therefore fail to impound publicly available information. While this creates profit opportunities for ambiguity-neutral investors, ambiguity-averse investors perceive that the benefit of ambiguity reduction outweighs the cost of trading against investors who have superior information. The model can explain both underreaction, such as that evident in postearnings announcement drifts and momentum, and overreaction to accounting accruals.

Strategic Financial Innovation in Segmented Markets

Rahi, R., Zigrand, J.-P. — 2008-06-15

We study an equilibrium model with restricted investor participation in which strategic arbitrageurs reap profits by exploiting mispricings across different market segments. We endogenize the asset structure as the outcome of a security design game played by the arbitrageurs. The equilibrium asset structure depends realistically upon considerations such as depth and gains from trade. It is neither complete nor socially optimal in general; the degree of inefficiency depends upon the heterogeneity of investors.

Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund

Becht, M., Franks, J., Mayer, C., Rossi, S. — 2008-05-28

This article reports a unique analysis of private engagements by an activist fund. It is based on data made available to us by Hermes, the fund manager owned by the British Telecom Pension Scheme, on engagements with management in companies targeted by its UK Focus Fund. In contrast with most previous studies of activism, we report that the fund executes shareholder activism predominantly through private interventions that would be unobservable in studies purely relying on public information. The fund substantially outperforms benchmarks and we estimate that abnormal returns are largely associated with engagements rather than stock picking.