Review of Financial Studies - recent issues

Editorial Board

Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:55 PST

Forthcoming Articles

Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:55 PST

Tunnel-Proofing the Executive Suite: Transparency, Temptation, and the Design of Executive Compensation

Noe, T. H. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:55 PST

This paper considers optimal compensation for a CEO who is entrusted with administering corporate assets honestly. Optimal compensation designs maximize integrity at minimum cost. These designs are very "low powered," i.e., while specifying a lower bound for performance and increasing pay with performance, they increase compensation at a rapidly decreasing rate. Thus, integrity considerations engender optimal compensation packages that closely resemble the very pervasive 80/120 bonus plans, exactly the sort of compensation that Jensen (2003) argues should compromise integrity. Under optimal designs, expected compensation increases linearly with firm size, and increases in the market/book ratio. Moreover, given optimal compensation, CEO asset diversion is limited to high market-to-book firms that have received negative productivity shocks.

A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium

Edmans, A., Gabaix, X., Landier, A. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:56 PST

This paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium, by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model. By considering multiplicative specifications for the CEO's utility and production functions, we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models. First, both the CEO's low fractional ownership (the Jensen–Murphy incentives measure) and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting, and thus need not reflect rent extraction. Second, the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value, divided by annual pay, is independent of firm size, and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives. Third, incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value, such as strategy choice. However, additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring.

Empire-Building or Bridge-Building? Evidence from New CEOs' Internal Capital Allocation Decisions

Xuan, Y. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:56 PST

This article investigates how the job histories of CEOs influence their capital allocation decisions when they preside over multidivisional firms. I find that, after CEO turnover, divisions not previously affiliated with the new CEO receive significantly more capital expenditures than divisions through which the new CEO has advanced. The pattern of reverse-favoritism in capital allocation is more pronounced if the new CEO has less authority or if the unaffiliated divisions have more bargaining power. I find evidence that having a specialist CEO negatively affects segment investment efficiency. The results suggest that new specialist CEOs use the capital budget as a bridge-building tool to elicit cooperation from powerful divisional managers in previously unaffiliated divisions.

Bankruptcy Codes and Innovation

Acharya, V. V., Subramanian, K. V. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:56 PST

We argue that when bankruptcy code is creditor friendly, excessive liquidations cause levered firms to shun innovation, whereas by promoting continuation upon failure, a debtor-friendly code induces greater innovation. We provide empirical support for this claim by employing patents as a proxy for innovation. Using time-series changes within a country and cross-country variation in creditor rights, we confirm that a creditor-friendly code leads to a lower absolute level of innovation by firms, as well as relatively lower innovation by firms in technologically innovative industries. When creditor rights are stronger, technologically innovative industries employ relatively less leverage and grow disproportionately slower.

Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control

Bodnaruk, A., Massa, M., Simonov, A. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:56 PST

We study holdings in merger and acquisition (M&A) targets by financial conglomerates in which affiliated investment banks advise the bidders. We show that advisors take positions in the targets before M&A announcements. These stakes are positively related to the probability of observing the bid and to the target premium. We argue that this can be explained in terms of advisors who are privy to important information about the deal, investing in the target in the expectation of its price increasing. We document the high profits of this strategy. The advisory stake is positively related to the likelihood of deal completion and to the termination fees. However, these deals are not wealth creating: there is a negative relation between the advisory stake and the viability of the deal.

Macro Factors in Bond Risk Premia

Ludvigson, S. C., Ng, S. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:56 PST

Are there important cyclical fluctuations in bond market premiums and, if so, with what macroeconomic aggregates do these premiums vary? We use the methodology of dynamic factor analysis for large datasets to investigate possible empirical linkages between forecastable variation in excess bond returns and macroeconomic fundamentals. We find that "real" and "inflation" factors have important forecasting power for future excess returns on U.S. government bonds, above and beyond the predictive power contained in forward rates and yield spreads. This behavior is ruled out by commonly employed affine term structure models where the forecastability of bond returns and bond yields is completely summarized by the cross-section of yields or forward rates. An important implication of these findings is that the cyclical behavior of estimated risk premia in both returns and long-term yields depends importantly on whether the information in macroeconomic factors is included in forecasts of excess bond returns. Without the macro factors, risk premia appear virtually acyclical, whereas with the estimated factors risk premia have a marked countercyclical component, consistent with theories that imply investors must be compensated for risks associated with macroeconomic activity.

Empirical Analysis of Corporate Credit Lines

Jimenez, G., Lopez, J. A., Saurina, J. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:56 PST

Since bank credit lines are a major source of corporate funding, we examine the determinants of their usage with a comprehensive database of Spanish corporate credit lines. A line's default status is a key factor driving its usage, which increases as firm financial conditions worsen. Firms with prior defaults access their credit lines less, suggesting that bank monitoring influences firms’ usage decisions. Line usage has an aging effect that causes it to decrease by roughly 10% per year of its life. Lender characteristics, such as the length of a firm's banking relationships, as well as macroeconomic conditions, affect usage decisions.

Explaining Credit Default Swap Spreads with the Equity Volatility and Jump Risks of Individual Firms

Zhang, B. Y., Zhou, H., Zhu, H. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:56 PST

This paper attempts to explain the credit default swap (CDS) premium, using a novel approach to identify the volatility and jump risks of individual firms from high-frequency equity prices. Our empirical results suggest that the volatility risk alone predicts 48% of the variation in CDS spread levels, whereas the jump risk alone forecasts 19%. After controlling for credit ratings, macroeconomic conditions, and firms' balance sheet information, we can explain 73% of the total variation. We calibrate a Merton-type structural model with stochastic volatility and jumps, which can help to match credit spreads after controlling for the historical default rates. Simulation evidence suggests that the high-frequency-based volatility measures can help to explain the credit spreads, above and beyond what is already captured by the true leverage ratio.

Basis Assets

Ahn, D.-H., Conrad, J., Dittmar, R. F. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:56 PST

This paper proposes a new method of forming basis assets. We use return correlations to sort securities into portfolios and compare the inferences drawn from this set of basis assets with those drawn from other benchmark portfolios. The proposed set of portfolios appears capable of generating measures of risk–return trade-off that are estimated with a lower error. In tests of asset pricing models, we find that the returns of these portfolios are significantly and positively related to both CAPM and Consumption CAPM risk measures, and there are significant components of these returns that are not captured by the three-factor model.

Brokerage Commissions and Institutional Trading Patterns

Goldstein, M. A., Irvine, P., Kandel, E., Wiener, Z. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:56 PST

The institutional brokerage industry faces an ever-increasing pressure to lower trading costs, which has already driven down average commissions and shifted volume toward low-cost execution venues. However, traditional full-service brokers that bundle execution with services remain a force and their commissions are still considerably higher than the marginal cost of trade execution. We hypothesize that commissions constitute a convenient way of charging a prearranged fixed fee for long-term access to a broker’s premium services. We derive testable predictions based on this hypothesis and test them on a large sample of institutional trades from 1999 to 2003. We find that institutions negotiate commissions infrequently, and thus commissions vary little with trade characteristics. Institutions also concentrate their order flow with a relatively small set of brokers, with smaller institutions concentrating their trading more than large institutions and paying higher per-share commissions. These results are stable over time, are consistent with our predictions, and cannot be explained by cost-minimization alone. Finally, we discuss the evolution of the institutional brokerage market within the proposed framework and make informal predictions about future developments in the industry.

Return Decomposition

Chen, L., Zhao, X. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:57 PST

A crucial issue in asset pricing is to understand the relative importance of discount rate (DR) news and cash flow (CF) news in driving the time-series and cross-sectional variations of stock returns. Many studies directly estimate the DR news but back out the CF news as the residual. We argue that this approach has a serious limitation because the DR news cannot be accurately measured due to the small predictive power, and the CF news, as the residual, inherits the large misspecification error of the DR news. We apply this residual-based decomposition approach to Treasury bonds and equities and find results that are either counterintuitive or unrobust. Potential solutions, including modeling both DR news and CF news directly, the Bayesian model averaging approach, and the principal component analysis, are explored.

Expected Returns and the Business Cycle: Heterogeneous Goods and Time-Varying Risk Aversion

Lochstoer, L. A. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:18:57 PST

This paper proposes a representative agent habit-formation model where preferences are defined for both luxury goods and basic goods. The model matches the equity risk premium, risk-free rate, and volatilities. From the intratemporal first-order condition, one can substitute out basic good consumption and the habit level, yielding a stochastic discount factor driven by two observable risk factors: luxury good consumption and the relative price of the two goods. I estimate these processes and find them to be heteroskedastic, implying time variation in the conditional volatility of the stochastic discount factor. These dynamics occur both at the business cycle frequency and at a lower, "generational" frequency. The findings reveal that the time variation in aggregate stock market and Treasury bond risk premiums are consistent with the predictions of the model.

Editorial Board

Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:21 PDT

Forthcoming Articles

Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:21 PDT

Anomalies

Li, E. X. N., Livdan, D., Zhang, L. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:21 PDT

We take a simple q-theory model and ask how well it can explain external financing anomalies, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Our central insight is that optimal investment is an important driving force of these anomalies. The model simultaneously reproduces procyclical equity issuance waves, the negative relation between investment and average returns, long-term underperformance following equity issues, positive long-term drift following cash distributions, the mean-reverting operating performance of issuing and cash-distributing firms, and the failure of the CAPM in explaining the long-term stock-price drifts. However, the model cannot fully capture the magnitude of the positive drift following cash distributions observed in the data.

Nonparametric Estimation of State-Price Densities Implicit in Interest Rate Cap Prices

Li, H., Zhao, F. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:21 PDT

Based on a multivariate extension of the constrained locally polynomial estimator of Aït-Sahalia and Duarte (2003), we provide one of the first nonparametric estimates of probability densities of LIBOR rates under forward martingale measures and state-price densities (SPDs) implicit in interest rate cap prices. The forward densities and SPDs depend significantly on the slope and volatility of LIBOR rates, and mortgage markets activities have strong impacts on the shape of the forward densities. The SPDs exhibit a pronounced U-shape as a function of future LIBOR rates, suggesting that the state prices are high at both extremely low and high interest rates, which tend to be associated with recessions and periods of high inflation, respectively. Our results provide nonparametric evidence of unspanned stochastic volatility and suggest that the unspanned factors could be partly driven by activities in the mortgage markets.

Good Times or Bad Times? Investors' Uncertainty and Stock Returns

Ozoguz, A. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:21 PDT

This paper investigates empirically the dynamics of investors' beliefs and Bayesian uncertainty about the state of the economy as state variables that describe the time-variation in investment opportunities. Using measures of uncertainty constructed from the state probabilities estimated from two-state regime-switching models of aggregate market return and of aggregate output, I find a negative relationship between the level of uncertainty and asset valuations. This relationship shows substantial cross-sectional variation across portfolios sorted on size, book-to-market, and past returns, especially conditional on the state of the economy. I show that a conditional model with investors' beliefs and an uncertainty risk factor is remarkably successful in explaining a large part of the cross-sectional variation in average portfolio returns. The uncertainty risk factor retains its incremental explanatory power when compared to other conditional models such as the conditional CAPM.

Unspanned Stochastic Volatility and the Pricing of Commodity Derivatives

Trolle, A. B., Schwartz, E. S. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:21 PDT

Commodity derivatives are becoming an increasingly important part of the global derivatives market. Here we develop a tractable stochastic volatility model for pricing commodity derivatives. The model features unspanned stochastic volatility, quasi-analytical prices of options on futures contracts, and dynamics of the futures curve in terms of a low-dimensional affine state vector. We estimate the model on NYMEX crude oil derivatives using an extensive panel data set of 45,517 futures prices and 233,104 option prices, spanning 4082 business days. We find strong evidence for two predominantly unspanned volatility factors.

Expected Stock Returns and Variance Risk Premia

Bollerslev, T., Tauchen, G., Zhou, H. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:21 PDT

Motivated by the implications from a stylized self-contained general equilibrium model incorporating the effects of time-varying economic uncertainty, we show that the difference between implied and realized variation, or the variance risk premium, is able to explain a nontrivial fraction of the time-series variation in post-1990 aggregate stock market returns, with high (low) premia predicting high (low) future returns. Our empirical results depend crucially on the use of "model-free," as opposed to Black–Scholes, options implied volatilities, along with accurate realized variation measures constructed from high-frequency intraday as opposed to daily data. The magnitude of the predictability is particularly strong at the intermediate quarterly return horizon, where it dominates that afforded by other popular predictor variables, such as the P/E ratio, the default spread, and the consumption–wealth ratio.

Understanding Index Option Returns

Broadie, M., Chernov, M., Johannes, M. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:21 PDT

Previous research concludes that options are mispriced based on the high average returns, CAPM alphas, and Sharpe ratios of various put selling strategies. One criticism of these conclusions is that these benchmarks are ill suited to handle the extreme statistical nature of option returns generated by nonlinear payoffs. We propose an alternative way to evaluate the statistical significance of option returns by comparing historical statistics to those generated by option pricing models. The most puzzling finding in the existing literature, the large returns to writing out-of-the-money puts, is not inconsistent (i.e., is statistically insignificant) relative to the Black-Scholes model or the Heston stochastic volatility model due to the extreme sampling uncertainty associated with put returns. This sampling problem can largely be alleviated by analyzing market-neutral portfolios such as straddles or delta-hedged returns. The returns on these portfolios can be explained by jump risk premiums and estimation risk.

Open-Loop Equilibria and Perfect Competition in Option Exercise Games

Back, K., Paulsen, D. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:21 PDT

The investment boundaries defined by Grenadier (2002) for an oligopoly investment game determine equilibria in open-loop strategies. As closed-loop strategies, they are not equilibria, because any firm by investing sooner can preempt the investments of other firms and expropriate the growth options. The perfectly competitive outcome is produced by closed-loop strategies that are mutually best responses. In this equilibrium, the option to delay investment has zero value, and the simple NPV rule is followed by all firms.

Benchmarking Money Manager Performance: Issues and Evidence

Chan, L. K. C., Dimmock, S. G., Lakonishok, J. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:21 PDT

Academic and practitioner research evaluates portfolio performance using size and value/growth attributes or factors. We assess the merits of popular evaluation procedures based on matched-characteristic benchmark portfolios or time-series return regressions by applying them to a sample of active money managers and passive indexes. Estimated abnormal returns display large variation across approaches. The benchmarks typically used in academic research—attribute-matched portfolios from independent sorts, the three-factor time-series model, and cross-sectional regressions of returns on stock characteristics—track returns poorly. Some simple alterations improve the performance of these methods.

A Dynamic Model of the Limit Order Book

Rosu, I. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:21 PDT

This paper presents a model of an order-driven market where fully strategic, symmetrically informed liquidity traders dynamically choose between limit and market orders, trading off execution price and waiting costs. In equilibrium, the bid and ask prices depend only on the numbers of buy and sell orders in the book. The model has a number of empirical predictions: (i) higher trading activity and higher trading competition cause smaller spreads and lower price impact; (ii) market orders lead to a temporary price impact larger than the permanent price impact, therefore to price overshooting; (iii) buy and sell orders can cluster away from the bid-ask spread, generating a hump-shaped order book; (iv) bid and ask prices display a comovement effect: after, e.g., a sell market order moves the bid price down, the ask price also falls, by a smaller amount, so the bid-ask spread widens; (v) when the order book is full, traders may submit quick, or fleeting, limit orders.

Size and Focus of a Venture Capitalist's Portfolio

Fulghieri, P., Sevilir, M. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:21 PDT

We take a portfolio approach to analyze the investment strategy of a venture capitalist (VC) and show that portfolio size and scope affect both the entrepreneurs' and the VC's incentives to exert effort. A small portfolio improves entrepreneurial incentives because it allows the VC to concentrate the limited human capital on a smaller number of startups, adding more value. A large and focused portfolio is beneficial because it allows the VC to reallocate the limited resources and human capital in the case of startup failure and allows the VC to extract greater rents from the entrepreneurs. We show that the VC finds it optimal to limit portfolio size when startups have higher payoff potential—that is, when providing strong entrepreneurial incentives is most valuable. The VC expands portfolio size only when startup fundamentals are more moderate and when he can form a sufficiently focused portfolio. Finally, we show that the VC may find it optimal to engage in portfolio management by divesting some of the startups early since this strategy allows him to extract a greater surplus.

Incentive Contracts in Delegated Portfolio Management

Li, C. W., Tiwari, A. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:21 PDT

This article analyzes optimal nonlinear portfolio management contracts. We consider a setting in which the investor faces moral hazard with respect to the effort and risk choices of the portfolio manager. The employment contract promises the manager: (i) a fixed payment, (ii) a proportional asset-based fee, (iii) a benchmark-linked fulcrum fee, and (iv) a benchmark-linked option-type "bonus" incentive fee. We show that the option-type incentive helps overcome the effort-underinvestment problem that undermines linear contracts. More generally, we find that for the set of contracts we consider, with the appropriate choice of benchmark it is always optimal to include a bonus incentive fee in the contract. We derive the conditions that such a benchmark must satisfy. Our results suggest that current regulatory restrictions on asymmetric performance-based fees in mutual fund advisory contracts may be costly.

On the Growth Effect of Stock Market Liberalizations

Gupta, N., Yuan, K. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:22 PDT

We investigate the effect of a stock market liberalization on industry growth in emerging markets. Consistent with the view that liberalization reduces financing constraints, we find that industries that are more externally dependent and face better growth opportunities grew faster following liberalization. However, this growth increase appears to come from an expansion in the size of existing firms rather than through the entry of financially constrained new firms. We show that following liberalization, new firm growth occurs in countries and industries with lower entry barriers. Hence, liberalization has a more uniform growth impact if accompanied by competition-enhancing reforms.

A Reexamination of Corporate Governance and Equity Prices

Johnson, S. A., Moorman, T. C., Sorescu, S. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:22 PDT

We reexamine long-term abnormal returns for portfolios sorted on governance characteristics. Firms with strong shareholder rights and firms with weak shareholder rights differ from the population of firms and from each other in how they cluster across industries. Using well-specified tests under this industry clustering, we find statistically zero long-term abnormal returns for portfolios sorted on governance. Our results have important implications for interpreting studies that link governance to firm value and stock returns, demonstrate the importance of the coarseness of industry definitions in financial research, and shed light on addressing statistical problems created by industry clustering in samples.

The Sale of Multiple Assets with Private Information

He, Z. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:22 PDT

By generalizing the Leland and Pyle (1977) model to the case of multiple correlated assets, this paper studies the signaling and hedging behavior of an intermediary who sells multiple assets in financial markets. Based on information asymmetry, this paper demonstrates the intrinsic interdependence of risk management and asset selling for intermediaries, and obtains several testable empirical implications. For instance, an intermediary with a more diversified underlying portfolio will face greater liquidity (a smaller price impact) when selling assets to the market. Several applications are discussed, including bank loan sales and selling mechanisms.

Option Backdating and Board Interlocks

Bizjak, J., Lemmon, M., Whitby, R. — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 09:52:22 PDT

We examine the role of board connections in explaining how the controversial practice of backdating employee stock options spread to a large number of firms across a wide range of industries. The increase in the likelihood that a firm begins to backdate stock options that can be explained by having a board member who is interlocked to a previously identified backdating firm is approximately one-third of the unconditional probability of backdating in our sample. Our analysis provides new insight into how boards function and the role that they play in providing managerial oversight and determining corporate strategy.

Editorial Board

Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:21 PDT

Forthcoming Articles

Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:21 PDT

The Limitations of Industry Concentration Measures Constructed with Compustat Data: Implications for Finance Research

Ali, A., Klasa, S., Yeung, E. — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:21 PDT

Industry concentration measures calculated with Compustat data, which cover only the public firms in an industry, are poor proxies for actual industry concentration. These measures have correlations of only 13% with the corresponding U.S. Census measures, which are based on all public and private firms in an industry. Also, only when U.S. Census measures are used is there evidence consistent with theoretical predictions that more-concentrated industries, which should be more oligopolistic, are populated by larger and fewer firms with higher price-cost margins. Further, the significant relations of Compustat-based industry concentration measures with the dependent variables of several important prior studies are not obtained when U.S. Census measures are used. One of the reasons for this occurrence is that Compustat-based measures proxy for industry decline. Overall, our results indicate that product markets research that uses Compustat-based industry concentration measures may lead to incorrect conclusions.

Disagreement and Learning in a Dynamic Contracting Model

Adrian, T., Westerfield, M. M. — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:21 PDT

We present a dynamic contracting model in which the principal and agent disagree about the resolution of uncertainty, and we illustrate the contract design in an application with Bayesian learning. The disagreement creates gains from trade that the principal realizes by transferring payment to states that the agent considers relatively more likely, changing incentives. The interaction between incentive provision and learning creates an intertemporal source of "disagreement risk" that alters optimal risk sharing. There is an endogenous regime shift between economies with small and large belief differences, and an early shock to beliefs can lead to large persistent differences in variable pay even after beliefs have converged. Under risk-neutrality, "selling the firm" to the agent does not implement the first-best because it precludes state-contingent trades.

Liquidity and Manipulation of Executive Compensation Schemes

Axelson, U., Baliga, S. — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:21 PDT

Compensation contracts have been criticized for encouraging managers to manipulate information. This includes bonus schemes that encourage earnings smoothing, and option packages that allow managers to cash out early when the firm is overvalued. We show that the intransparency induced by these contract features is critical for giving long-term incentives. Lack of transparency makes it harder for the owner to engage in ex post optimal but ex ante inefficient liquidity provision to the manager. For the same reason, it is often optimal to "pay for luck" (i.e., tie long-term compensation to variables that the manager has no influence over, but may have private information about, such as future profitability of the whole industry).

Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies

Cronqvist, H., Fahlenbrach, R. — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:21 PDT

We analyze the effects of heterogeneity across large shareholders, using a new blockholder-firm panel dataset in which we can track all unique blockholders among large public firms in the United States. We find statistically significant and economically important blockholder fixed effects in investment, financial, and executive compensation policies. We also find blockholder fixed effects in firm performance measures, and differences in corporate policies are systematically related to differences in firm performance. We study potential sources of the heterogeneity and find that blockholders with a larger block size, board membership, direct management involvement, or with a single decision maker are associated with larger effects on corporate policies and firm performance.

Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-management Appointments

Ljungqvist, A., Marston, F., Wilhelm, W. J. — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:21 PDT

We show that relatively optimistic research and even the mere provision of research coverage for the issuer (regardless of its direction) attract co-management appointments for securities offerings. Co-management appointments are valuable because they help banks establish relationships with issuers. These relationships, in turn, substantially increase the banks’ chances of winning more lucrative lead-management mandates in the future. This is true even in the presence of historically exclusive banking relationships.

Ownership: Evolution and Regulation

Franks, J., Mayer, C., Rossi, S. — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:21 PDT

This article is the first study of long-run evolution of investor protection and corporate ownership in the United Kingdom over the twentieth century. Formal investor protection emerged only in the second half of the century. We assess the influence of investor protection on ownership by comparing cross-sections of firms at different times in the century and the evolution of firms incorporating at different stages of the century. Investor protection had little impact on dispersion of ownership: even in the absence of investor protection, rates of dispersion of ownership were high, associated primarily with mergers. Preliminary evidence suggests that ownership dispersion in the United Kingdom relied more on informal relations of trust than on formal investor protection.

Estimating the Effect of Hierarchies on Information Use

Liberti, J. M., Mian, A. R. — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:21 PDT

Theory suggests that greater hierarchical distance between a subordinate and his boss makes it more difficult to share abstract and subjective information in decision making. A novel dataset put together from credit dossiers of large corporate loan applicants enables us to observe the information collected by loan officers, and how it is used by the ultimate loan approving officer. We find that greater hierarchical/geographical distance between the information collecting agent and the loan approving officer leads to less reliance on subjective information and more on objective information. By exploiting nonlinearities in the "assignment rules" that determine an applicant's hierarchical distance, and using information collecting agent fixed effects, we show that our result cannot be driven by endogenous assignment of applicants. We also find that higher frequency of interactions between the information collecting agent and loan approving officer, both over time and through geographical proximity, helps mitigate the effects of hierarchical distance on information use. Our results show that hierarchical distance influences information use, and highlights the importance of "human touch" in communication.

Pension Reform, Ownership Structure, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Giannetti, M., Laeven, L. — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:21 PDT

Sweden offers a unique natural experiment to analyze the effects of institutionalized saving on the ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm performance. The Swedish pension reform increased the stock market participation of pension funds, causing a significant reshuffling in the ownership of pension funds. We show that the effects of institutional investment on firm performance depend on the industry structure of pension funds. Firm valuation improves if public pension funds and large independent private pension funds increase their shareholdings. Additionally, controlling shareholders appear reluctant to relinquish control and the control premium increases if public pension funds acquire shares.

Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund Industry

Bergstresser, D., Chalmers, J. M. R., Tufano, P. — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:21 PDT

Many investors purchase mutual funds through intermediated channels, paying brokers or financial advisors for fund selection and advice. This article attempts to quantify the benefits that investors enjoy in exchange for the costs of these services. We study broker-sold and direct-sold funds from 1996 to 2004, and fail to find that brokers deliver substantial tangible benefits. Relative to direct-sold funds, broker-sold funds deliver lower risk-adjusted returns, even before subtracting distribution costs. These results hold across fund objectives, with the exception of foreign equity funds. Further, broker-sold funds exhibit no more skill at aggregate-level asset allocation than do funds sold through the direct channel. Our results are consistent with two hypotheses: that brokers deliver substantial intangible benefits that we do not observe and that there are material conflicts of interest between brokers and their clients.

Ambiguity Aversion and the Term Structure of Interest Rates

Gagliardini, P., Porchia, P., Trojani, F. — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:21 PDT

This paper studies the term structure implications of a simple structural model in which the representative agent displays ambiguity aversion, modeled by Multiple Priors Recursive Utility. Bond excess returns reflect a premium for ambiguity, which is observationally distinct from the risk premium of affine yield curve models. The ambiguity premium can be large even in the simplest log-utility setting and is also nonzero for stochastic factors that have a zero risk premium. A calibrated low-dimensional two-factor model with ambiguity is able to reproduce the deviations from the expectations hypothesis documented in the literature, without modifying in a substantial way the nonlinear mean-reversion dynamics of the short interest rate. Moreover, the model does not imply any apparent trade-off between fitting the first and second moments of the yield curve.

Conflicts of Interest and Stock Recommendations: The Effects of the Global Settlement and Related Regulations

Kadan, O., Madureira, L., Wang, R., Zach, T. — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:21 PDT

We study the effect of the Global Analyst Research Settlement and related regulations on sell-side research. These regulations attempted to mitigate the interdependence between research and investment banking. We document that following the regulations many brokerage houses have migrated from the traditional five-tier rating system to a three-tier system. Optimistic recommendations have become less frequent and more informative, whereas neutral and pessimistic recommendations have become more frequent and less informative. Importantly, the overall informativeness of recommendations has declined. The likelihood of issuing optimistic recommendations no longer depends on affiliation with the covered firm, although affiliated analysts are still reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations.

Measuring Abnormal Bond Performance

Bessembinder, H., Kahle, K. M., Maxwell, W. F., Xu, D. — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:22 PDT

We analyze the empirical power and specification of test statistics designed to detect abnormal bond returns in corporate event studies, using monthly and daily data. We find that test statistics based on frequently used methods of calculating abnormal monthly bond returns are biased. Most methods implemented in monthly data also lack power to detect abnormal returns. We also consider unique issues arising when using the newly available daily bond data, and formulate and test methods to calculate daily abnormal bond returns. Using daily bond data significantly increases the power of the tests, relative to the monthly data. Weighting individual trades by size while eliminating noninstitutional trades from the TRACE data also increases the power of the tests to detect abnormal performance, relative to using all trades or the last price of the day. Further, value-weighted portfolio-matching approaches are better specified and more powerful than equal-weighted approaches. Finally, we examine abnormal bond returns to acquirers around mergers and acquisitions to demonstrate how the abnormal return model and use of daily versus monthly data can affect inferences.

Demand-Based Option Pricing

Garleanu, N., Pedersen, L. H., Poteshman, A. M. — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 06:34:22 PDT

We model demand-pressure effects on option prices. The model shows that demand pressure in one option contract increases its price by an amount proportional to the variance of the unhedgeable part of the option. Similarly, the demand pressure increases the price of any other option by an amount proportional to the covariance of the unhedgeable parts of the two options. Empirically, we identify aggregate positions of dealers and end-users using a unique dataset, and show that demand-pressure effects make a contribution to well-known option-pricing puzzles. Indeed, time-series tests show that demand helps explain the overall expensiveness and skew patterns of index options, and cross-sectional tests show that demand impacts the expensiveness of single-stock options as well.

Review of Financial Studies - recent issues

Editorial Board

Forthcoming Articles

Contents

Tunnel-Proofing the Executive Suite: Transparency, Temptation, and the Design of Executive Compensation

A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium

Empire-Building or Bridge-Building? Evidence from New CEOs' Internal Capital Allocation Decisions

Bankruptcy Codes and Innovation

Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control

Macro Factors in Bond Risk Premia

Empirical Analysis of Corporate Credit Lines

Explaining Credit Default Swap Spreads with the Equity Volatility and Jump Risks of Individual Firms

Basis Assets

Brokerage Commissions and Institutional Trading Patterns

Return Decomposition

Expected Returns and the Business Cycle: Heterogeneous Goods and Time-Varying Risk Aversion

Editorial Board

Forthcoming Articles

Contents

Anomalies

Nonparametric Estimation of State-Price Densities Implicit in Interest Rate Cap Prices

Good Times or Bad Times? Investors' Uncertainty and Stock Returns

Unspanned Stochastic Volatility and the Pricing of Commodity Derivatives

Expected Stock Returns and Variance Risk Premia

Understanding Index Option Returns

Open-Loop Equilibria and Perfect Competition in Option Exercise Games

Benchmarking Money Manager Performance: Issues and Evidence

A Dynamic Model of the Limit Order Book

Size and Focus of a Venture Capitalist's Portfolio

Incentive Contracts in Delegated Portfolio Management

On the Growth Effect of Stock Market Liberalizations

A Reexamination of Corporate Governance and Equity Prices

The Sale of Multiple Assets with Private Information

Option Backdating and Board Interlocks

Editorial Board

Forthcoming Articles

Contents

The Limitations of Industry Concentration Measures Constructed with Compustat Data: Implications for Finance Research

Disagreement and Learning in a Dynamic Contracting Model

Liquidity and Manipulation of Executive Compensation Schemes

Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies

Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-management Appointments

Ownership: Evolution and Regulation

Estimating the Effect of Hierarchies on Information Use

Pension Reform, Ownership Structure, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund Industry

Ambiguity Aversion and the Term Structure of Interest Rates

Conflicts of Interest and Stock Recommendations: The Effects of the Global Settlement and Related Regulations

Measuring Abnormal Bond Performance

Demand-Based Option Pricing